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Sage mir, was du vom Übersetzen hältst, und ich sage dir, wer du bist. 
 
Tell me what you think of translation, and I’ll tell you who you are.   
 
—Martin Heidegger, Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister” 
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Introduction: The Problem of Language and Translation in Heidegger’s Thinking 
 
Two days after his 80th birthday Martin Heidegger sat down for a television 
interview with Richard Wisser.1 The year was 1969, far past his early years in Marburg, 
the publication of Being and Time, and the “turn” of the 1930’s. With the trajectory and 
development of his thinking having now become more or less defined, Wisser was well 
aware that Heidegger’s principal concern was to arrive at a new kind of “thinking” that 
would move beyond the metaphysical essence he attributes to philosophy since the days 
of Plato. This essence, shown most clearly with the advent of Descartes, fixes the 
discipline of philosophy around the rational subject, the thinking I, and asserts that the 
power to know lies in a particular authority of the I that represents objects in the world to 
itself. A thinking beyond this subjectivity would thus dethrone the subject’s authority, 
bringing about an “ecological” sense of man—a sense of man not as the lord of beings, 
but as amidst and concerned with beings, or more importantly, Being itself. Hence 
thinking would not be the result of some kind of cognitive development or the invention 
of a new discipline, but only—so Heidegger believes—if man and how he relates to the 
world around him go through a fundamental transformation. In this context we listen to 
Wisser’s concluding question and Heidegger’s response.   
Evidently for you, everything depends upon […] the experience of ‘Da-sein’ in 
which man realizes himself as a being who is open to Being, and to whom Being 
presents itself as unconcealment. You have dedicated your complete work to 
proving the necessity for such a change in humanity through the experience of 
‘Da-sein.’ Do you see any indications that what you have thought necessary will 
become a reality? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See Heidegger’s chronology on http://www.beyng.com/href.html.  
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           Heidegger responds slowly, stating that “no one knows what the destiny of 
thinking will be.” He continues, citing the lecture “The End of Philosophy and the Task 
of Thinking,” saying that the thinking he envisions is “much simpler” than that 
encountered in metaphysics, “but, precisely because of its simplicity, it is much more 
difficult to accomplish” (MHiC 46-7). Attending to such a difficulty, Heidegger 
concludes, “requires a new attentiveness to language, not the invention of new terms, as I 
once thought; rather it requires a return to the original contents of our own language as it 
has been conceived, which is constantly decaying” (PR viii, italics added).  
          While Heidegger had identified this modern decadence of language as early as the 
mid 1920’s, it is only during the 1930’s and 40’s that he began to give it the attention he 
always knew it deserved. In the “Letter on Humanism” (1947), Heidegger tells us that our 
modern age is witness to a “widely and rapidly spreading devastation of language.” Such 
devastation has occurred insofar as language, “under the dominance of the modern 
metaphysics of subjectivity,” “almost irremediably falls out of its element” and thus 
“denies us its essence.” As “out of its element,”  
…language surrenders itself to our mere willing and trafficking as an instrument 
of domination over beings. Beings themselves appear as actualities in the 
interaction of cause and effect. We encounter beings as actualities in a calculative 
businesslike way, but also scientifically and by way of philosophy, with 
explanations and proofs (LH 223).  
 
The most direct goal of the “neue Sorgfalt” Heidegger advocates—the new 
attentiveness to or care for language—is thus, in the shortest of terms, to put language 
back on track. Through such attention we are to relinquish the idea that language is 
simply a tool to be used for human progress, a matter of the calculations, assertions, and 
proofs grounded in the authority of the rational subject, and see language rather as one of 
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the ways man essentially exists in his world. As Heidegger says, it is not a matter of 
gaining “scientific and philosophical information about language,” but of “undergoing an 
experience with language,” experiencing how language “befalls us, strikes us, comes over 
us, overwhelms and transforms us” (NL 59, 57). The proper response to language’s 
devastation is not the abandonment of it and the arbitrary invention of a “new language,” 
but exactly the opposite: a revival of those “primordial experiences,” those primordial 
ways of speaking, the “elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself” (BT 220), “in 
which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being—the ways which 
have guided us ever since” (BT 22).2 If we can do this—if we can find a “way to 
language”—we will not only learn to speak in a new way, but to be in a new way. For 
Heidegger, the question of the essence of language is not “just semantics”: it is a question 
that “[touches] the innermost nexus of our existence” (NL 57).  
The goal of the present project is to come to terms with this odd imperative 
Heidegger gives thinking “at the end of philosophy.” We will ask what such attentiveness 
to language looks like, and how we ourselves, with Heidegger, are to carry it out. To do 
this, we must understand both why metaphysics brings language out of its element and 
how Heidegger believes it can be brought back. For how are we to return to the “original 
contents” of our own language, and why does originality/primordiality represent the right 
track for language? And finally, if we succeed in bringing language back to its element, 
how is such a process to affect man?    
Such questions yield no simple answers. For as I will show throughout this paper, 
attending to Heidegger’s “philosophy of language” necessarily entails confronting the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 All references to Being and Time will use the “H” page numbers; all other citations will 
refer to the specific publication cited.   
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entire constellation of Heideggerian thought. Isolating this area of questioning as if it was 
simply one path among others is not an option, for the attentiveness Heidegger calls for 
cannot come about solely through the study of words: it is as much a linguistic affair as it 
is an ontological, existential, aesthetic, and political/historical one. Therefore, what 
follows will not be what one might expect from a paper about the philosophy of 
language. We will talk far more about metaphysics, the ancient Greeks, and poetry than 
about different questions and theorists that make up a philosophical discipline. For the 
only way to get at what Heidegger is trying to do with language is by refusing to set him 
against the relief of a pre-established domain and instead follow how the problem of 
language arose organically out of the different dimensions of his thinking. For nothing in 
Heidegger is isolated. Each question he asks cascades forth into a series of other 
questions, answers, ideas and ambiguities. To address the question of technology we 
must look back to the Greek meaning of technē; to find the meaning of a work of art we 
must first work towards finding the essence of truth; to analyze a hymn by Hölderlin we 
must turn to the choral ode in Sophocles’ Antigone. Such a list could go on endlessly—
and this fact alone is, in my eyes, enough to prove the necessity of de-isolating 
Heidegger’s “philosophy of language” from his “philosophy of” Being, history, or 
existence. 
Like almost all aspects of Heidegger’s thought, there is no lack of scholarship 
when it comes to the question of language. Some scholars choose to focus on the earlier 
Heidegger, specifically what he says in Being and Time and its connection to the 
phenomenological tradition whose origin is credited to Heidegger’s mentor, Edmund 
Husserl. Others have looked to the 1930’s and 40’s at what might be dubbed Heidegger’s 
	   5	  
“experiments” with language, especially the notoriously difficult Contributions to 
Philosophy and The Event. Still more have honed in on Heidegger’s ceaseless 
preoccupation with poetry, pointing to his lectures on Hölderlin, Rilke, Trakl, and George 
as the key to his interest in language.  
While all of these retain their significance in what follows, this project wishes to 
look at another issue that has been somewhat left in the dark, an issue we will find to be 
intimately related with Heidegger’s words to Wisser: translation. The book of essays 
Heidegger, Translation, and the Task of Thinking has done a fine job of breaching the 
problem, but its principal concern lies with how we should translate important German 
terms of Heidegger (Dasein, Ereignis, etc.) into English. What follows turns its attention 
instead to what Heidegger himself said concerning translation, and perhaps more 
importantly, the question of how the role his “method” of translations, as well as those 
translations themselves, play a defining role in shaping his ideas on language—and thus 
his philosophy as a whole. What I wish to put forth is the idea that, although the 
attentiveness to language Heidegger calls for is exemplified in all the topics mentioned 
above, it is encountered in a distinctively integral way in how he encounters and 
translates philosophic and poet works, especially those written in ancient Greek and 
Latin. More specifically, I will argue that what is most at stake in Heidegger’s philosophy 
of language—a return to language’s “original contents”—is brought forth most 
effectively in Heidegger’s philosophy of translation.  
The difficulty of this endeavor is to do justice both to the specificity of the issue 
just laid out and the fact that Heidegger’s philosophy of language must necessarily be 
seen in light of other key dimensions of his thinking. Given this state of affairs, we will 
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appeal to these other areas of Heideggerian thought to serve as lenses, perspectives, ways 
of characterizing what is thought-worthy in his conception of language. The aim of the 
first half of the project will be to show how and why Heidegger’s ideas concerning 
language must be seen as ontological (having to do with the question of Being), 
existential (having to do with the essence of man), aesthetic (having to do with poetry 
and the work of art), and political/historical (having to do with nationality and a Volk, as 
well as the question of history). We will begin by introducing the role of language in 
Being and Time, looking specifically at how Heidegger defines language in opposition to 
the paradigmatic example of metaphysics, the assertion or proposition.3 We will then 
jump into the 1930’s to see how Heidegger tries to turn us away from this understanding 
of language towards a “poetical” one, and how the issue of whether we turn with him is 
of the utmost significance for the future of mankind. Finally, we will give credence to the 
political implications of Heidegger’s thoughts on language by looking at his conception 
of the German Volk and the particular virtuosity of the German language.  
In the second half of the project we will move from Heidegger’s love of the 
German language to his absolute infatuation with the Greek language. This will open up 
an opportunity to look at the issue of the plurality of languages, the fact that language is 
not universal but varies across space and time. For when it comes to the task of 
translation, what it essential for Heidegger is that one accomplishes “the transition from 
the spirit of one language into that of another” (HHdI 62, italics added). To see why this 
is essential and how it can be accomplished, we will look first at some general remarks 
on translation contained in the lecture Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister.” From here, before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It is important to note that these two words are used interchangeably. 
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moving to the issue of translation “proper,” we will take a slight detour through the 
lecture series Was heisst Denken? (What is Called Thinking? or What Calls for 
Thinking?) in order to see one of the two main ways in which the “original contents” of 
language are dealt with in Heidegger’s thinking (as well as translation’s role therein). In 
our fourth and last chapter, we will move to the issue of translation in the context of the 
Greeks, attempting to understand their centrality in Heidegger’s thinking as well as 
giving a detailed analysis of “Anaximander’s Saying,” an essay in which we are afforded 
a view of the process of translation in action. Finally, in our conclusion, we will try to 
bring together all that has been said, showing how it has helped us understand the 
quotation that prompts our present endeavor:  
…it requires a new attentiveness to language, not the invention of new terms, as I 
once thought; rather it requires a return to the original contents of our own 
language as it has been conceived, which is constantly decaying,” (PR viii, italics 
added).  
 
Before we begin, let me expand slightly on each of the four chapters that make up 
the two halves just mentioned. The first chapter begins with a brief analysis of a few 
sections on language in Being and Time, outlining an “early” Heideggerian understanding 
of language as discourse. From discourse we will move to Heidegger’s understanding of 
the assertion, both in how it stands as the paradigmatic example of language for 
metaphysical thinking and in how it originated in the thinking of the Greeks, thus imbued 
with their ontology. To understand the potentially harmful consequences of 
understanding language in terms of the assertion, we will attempt to outline the role it 
plays in metaphysical thinking, what metaphysical thinking itself means for Heidegger, 
and the way such thinking, in the form of consummate subjectivity, seeks to assert the 
domination of man over the entire globe. In opposition to this, we will sketch a version of 
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Heidegger’s ontological views that breaks ontology into three separate tiers, each of 
which must be approached differently than the way they have been (or simply have not 
been) approached by metaphysics. Finally, on the basis of this thinking, we will point to 
the eventual “turn” Heidegger took away from Being and Time in the 1930’s, a turn 
towards a new way of approaching language on the basis of poetry.  
In our second chapter, we will move form the ontological (and, by extension, 
existential) background of Heidegger’s thoughts on language to the way it is rethought on 
aesthetic grounds, particularly that of poetry. Beginning with “The Origin of the Work of 
Art,” we will work our way from out of the logical-grammatical interpretation of 
language (language understood in terms of the assertion) to Heidegger’s notion of 
language as poetic saying by seeing how he rethinks the essence of language both 
aesthetically and in line with his three-tiered ontology. In art and poetry we will see a 
way of relating to beings outside of the scientific pursuits met with by means of assertive 
logic, a way of relating that lets beings manifest themselves rather than casting them in 
the shadow of the representational subject. Pushing this vision further, we will see how 
Heidegger begins to think of poetic language as that which “alone gives presence to the 
thing,” that which, first and foremost, grants Being to things (NL 62). In this new, cryptic, 
perhaps even mystical approach to language, where it is man who listens and language 
who speaks, where language occurs as “an event” (das Ereignis) in which beings are 
named and brought to presence, we will attempt to highlight Heidegger’s philosophical 
motivations insofar as they are tied to his goal of overcoming metaphysics and 
dethroning the sway of subjectivity.  
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From here, after we have ventured into the challenging essays of the 1950’s (“The 
Nature of Language,” “The Way to Language,” “Language”), we will return to 
Heidegger’s preoccupation with poetry, in particular, the poetry of Friedrich Hölderlin. In 
this figure, verging on that of prophetic, Heidegger sees a man who not only “poeticizes 
the essence of poetry” and thus provides unending stimulus for a thinking attempting to 
move away from metaphysics (Biemel 78), but also a man whose work “confronts the 
Germans as a test” (OWA 203). This test, a test of the historical destiny of the German 
people, helps us to understand the political background and consequences of Heidegger’s 
thoughts on language, at least during the 1930’s and early 40’s. Here, we will encounter 
the notorious issue of Heidegger’s involvement in National Socialism, an inexcusable 
involvement that was nonetheless vehemently philosophically justified (or “interpreted”). 
While many of these justifications can simply be discarded on the grounds of nationalist 
sentiments, we will find that one of its most important premises—the philosophical and 
poetic superiority of the German language—is grounded on something worthy of our 
thought: namely, the plurality of languages, the fact that each language has its own 
“historical spirit,” to use Heidegger’s words (HHdI 62).  
In our third chapter, taking the plurality of languages as our cue, we will begin 
our study of translation. The 1942 lecture Hölderlin’s Hymn “The Ister” will provide us 
with key ideas about how Heidegger thought about translation, specifically the fact that 
Heidegger saw translation not as a technical enterprise, but rather as a kind of thoughtful 
meditation on and a faithful mediation between one’s own language and the foreign 
language. In this process, one is not only forced to enter into a new language (and with it, 
its own way of thinking), but even more so, one’s thoroughly common and familiar 
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relationship with one’s own language is shaken, unsettled, and reckoned with. With this 
idea, we move into the lecture series Was heisst Denken?, getting a view of how 
Heidegger begins to unsettle his relationship with German (specifically with the word 
“thinking” [Denken]) by trying to return to its more “original contents.” Here, we will see 
a central idea that underlies the way Heidegger thinks about translation: namely, his 
distinction between words (Worte) and terms (Wörter). This idea, harkening back to our 
discussion of the metaphysical conception of language (here thought of as how it sees 
language as terms), will further aid us in understanding how his “method” of translation 
privileges being faithful to the spirit of the foreign language over being literal in one’s 
choice of words.  
In our fourth and final chapter we will think translation in the context of the 
Greeks. Returning to the idea of the “original contents of our language,” we will see the 
second main way in which this idea is at stake in his thinking (namely, its bearing on 
translation). Here, Heidegger tries to develop a “way” of translating that is up to the task 
of preserving the original meaning these words had to the thinkers that uttered them. We 
will see that such preservation is necessary given Heidegger’s understanding of history 
and tradition, as well as the superiority—the greater “proximity to Being” (Cassin 10)—
of early Greek thinking (that is, those before Plato) and, in consequence, the Greek 
language. In response to the disastrous consequences Heidegger recognizes in the Latin 
(Roman) translations of Greek philosophical terms, Heidegger’s approach to translation 
must accomplish what seems to be impossible: overcome tradition and our historical 
thrownness by preserving a totally foreign way of thinking in our own metaphysically 
conditioned thoughts and words (what the Romans failed to do). As we will see, in more 
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“practical” terms, Heidegger’s “method” of translation is meant to accomplish this in two 
ways: first, by means of etymological considerations (considerations that often reinterpret 
a word based on the meaning of its roots or its archaic form and function—its “original 
contents”), and second, by means of comparative analysis (comparing instances where 
the word is used by other thinkers to help determine how it was understood historically). 
Naturally, our final question will thus be how translation, given Heidegger’s own terms, 
can in fact be accomplished—a possibility that must exist, given that it is that on which 
the fate of thinking—and thus humanity itself—rests. 
However, things are not as simple as determining exactly “how” translation à la 
Heidegger is possible, as if we could determine this objectively, according to a strictly 
logical basis. In our conclusion, we will see that given Heidegger’s understanding of 
thinking itself, the question of language and the question of translation are not the kind of 
questions that can be determined by coherent arguments and proofs. The way of thinking 
required to respond to them thoughtfully is not a straight line towards an answer, but as 
Heidegger understands the term “way” (Weg) itself, a kind of continual circling back, a 
constant being underway (Unterwegs). Through all of the “answers” we may come to 
over the course of this project, despite any results and questions of practical applicability, 
the sole thing that remains essential is that we get underway—that we treat these 
questions as they deserved to be treated, with a thinking that always remains on the way 
(hence the title of one of Heidegger’s works, On the Way to Language). While it may 
seem strange to ask questions we are not assured we can answer, this is what is required. 
With that said, let us get underway.   
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I. The Logical-Grammatical Conception of Language: Assertion, Ontology, and the 
History of Metaphysics 
 
 
Insofar as we are to heed the both the holism of Heidegger’s thinking as well as 
the development of that thinking over the course of his career, we will begin with a brief 
study of the role of language in Being and Time. This is best not only because the 
understanding of language advanced here is Heidegger’s first concrete attempt at a 
“definition” of language, but even more importantly, because it establishes a foundation 
upon which Heidegger’s latter thoughts can be seen as extensions and modifications.  
The topic of language arises here explicitly in section 34, “Being-there and 
Discourse. Language” (160), but it also plays an important role in the preceding section 
(“Assertion as a Derivative Mode of Interpretation,” 153). For our purposes, we shall 
proceed by outlining what I take to be the three most fundamental things Heidegger says 
about the nature of language in these sections. First, that “the existential-ontological 
foundation of language is discourse or talk [Rede]” (161); second, that language “has its 
roots in the existential constitution of Dasein’s disclosedness” (160); and third, that all 
philosophy, as Richard Polt puts it, takes “assertions as the paradigmatic expression” of 
language and thinking (66).  
To extract this first point from Heidegger’s early terminology, we can say that 
language is characterized fundamentally by discourse. Language is something we speak 
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and hear—it is, as was said in the previous section, “communication” (155). The 
meaning4 of this discourse or communication is that it is “the Articulation of 
intelligibility.” In other words, discourse “is the way in which we articulate 
‘significantly’ the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world” (161)—it is the way that we utter 
or express what has been previously given to our understanding. Polt, again, describes 
this succinctly. “Discourse is the tendency of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world to get 
articulated.” Through language, “our lives and environs emerge,” and “a network of 
significance and purpose—a world—becomes apparent to us in our operations. As we do 
things, things become meaningful articles in an articulated whole” (64).  
Language as we would think of it in terms of everyday usage—“a vocabulary and 
a grammar” (64), or as Heidegger says, a set of “word-Things which are present-at-hand” 
(BT 161)—is thus “rooted in the existential constitution of Dasein’s disclosedness”: it is a 
derivative form of the more basic tendency of human beings not only to bring things to 
light and disclose them as they are (think of the impulse towards religion or science), but 
to infuse meaning into things and create a diverse world and a rich history. While on the 
one hand discourse can simply be “talk about something” and thus a “making-known” 
(161-2), it has the ontological and existential significance of disclosing Dasein’s Being-
in-the-world, of disclosing that it is-there (Da-sein). Language (as discourse) is that 
which not only can point things out and create meaning, but also that which expresses 
Dasein’s state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit), its experiences, its understanding, and its Being-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 It is important to note the use of the word meaning rather than function (of discourse). If 
we speak of the function of discourse, we are already treating it as a tool, something we 
simply “use,” a mere means to an end. As we have and will continue to see, this is not 
what Heidegger has in mind.  
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with others in a “shared” community (BT 162)—in short, its world and what it means to 
be-there.  
Now, while Heidegger intends language to be understood in the more ontological 
sense of Being-in-the-world and disclosedness, he knows that it has been and generally is 
understood through the paradigm of the assertion or proposition. Assertions are what the 
symbolic logic teacher is dealing with when he tells us on the first day of class that “All 
humans are mortal. All Greeks are humans. All Greeks are mortal.” While he would go 
on to speak of major and minor premises, conclusions, and universal propositions, 
Heidegger’s explanation, oddly enough, seems much simpler. At the ontologically most 
basic level, Heidegger says that each proposition points something out (mortality) about 
something (all humans). This pointing out takes the form of a predicating: “the ‘subject’ 
is given a definite character by the ‘predicate’” (154). Finally, because an assertion is 
generally a public matter, it is characterized by communication, by “letting someone see 
with us what we have pointed out through predication” (155). And so, in the typical style 
of Being and Time, we can say that an assertion is “a pointing-out which gives something 
a definite character and which communicates” (156).  
So, we might ask, why does Heidegger find the fact that we (philosophers) take 
this form of language as the paradigm so disturbing? There are two answers we could 
give to this question. On the one hand, the problem with the assertion is that it stands in 
as the paradigm of language, and in so doing discounts all other forms of discourse—be 
they performative (like a silent nod, the shrug of a shoulder, or as Heidegger’s examples 
go, hearing and keeping silent) or simply more profound or genuine than the assertion 
(for Heidegger, great poetry). But there is another reason why Heidegger finds the 
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assertion so problematic that gets to what the assertion does in an ontological and 
existential sense. For while he does not hold the assertion to be incorrect or unintelligible, 
Heidegger does feel that the assertion solidifies a way of understanding the world that 
poses a “threat to the essence of humanity” (LH 222). Thus while metaphysics is at fault, 
on the one hand, simply because it takes the assertion to be the essence of language, 
rather than a merely derivative mode, it is also at fault because of the way the assertion 
propagates the authority of a subject (the subject of the sentence) over a world of objects 
(predicates). As Heidegger’s narrative tells us, the seemingly harmless act of 
understanding language as a linking of subjects and predicates would have disastrous 
historical consequences, as it slowly propels man to the status of “the lord of beings,” an 
existence in no way suited for authentic Dasein. To see why this is so we must follow the 
history of philosophy (for Heidegger, metaphysics) from its original emphasis on the 
assertion to its modern day form of “absolute and consummate subjectivity” (NIII 225), 
our goal being to arrive at a point where we can begin to differentiate language in its 
inauthentic mode and in its authentic mode (what Heidegger calls “poetic saying”).  
What we refer to as inauthentic discourse can be viewed either from the everyday 
perspective, where it becomes Gerede or “idle talk,” or from the formal metaphysical 
perspective, where it is tied to the predication of beings and the question of truth (ideas 
which will become clearer later on). Beginning with the former, we note that das Gerede, 
the center of section 35, is the everyday Being of discourse. In our daily interactions with 
one another, we communicate this or that about what’s currently going on, what 
happened last week, or what we’re planning to do this afternoon. Such communication 
(remembering here that Heidegger links communication with the assertion) serves to 
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bring “the hearer to participate in disclosed Being towards what is talked about in the 
discourse,” to tell someone about something. However, within such communication 
“there lies an average intelligibility”—a basic way of understanding what is said without, 
so to speak, actually understanding what is said. As Heidegger puts it, “we do not so 
much understand the entities which are talked about; we already are listening only to 
what is said-in-the-talk as such. What is said-in-the-talk gets understood; but what the 
talk is about is understood only approximately and superficially” (168). “What the talk is 
about”—men and mortality—doesn’t become a point of inquiry; the particular substance 
or content of the assertion is rather leveled-off into the realm of average intelligibility, 
whether that be merely the propositional form or, as seems more in line with what 
Heidegger is saying, the basic or general way in which all of us understand what “men” 
and “mortality” mean without needing to push further into what these words and their 
combination in the proposition are truly about.  
Further, because this kind of everyday discourse is simply the articulation of 
intelligibility—the putting into words of what one already understands—it “has lost its 
primary relationship-of-Being towards the entity talked about” and instead communicates 
“by following the route of gossiping and passing the word along” (168). In this way, 
“what is said-in-the-talk as such”—the mere articulation as opposed to what the 
proposition is really about—“spreads in wider circles and takes on an authoritative 
character. Things are so because one says so”—and no further inquiry is needed (168). 
Thus idle talk’s “initial lack of grounds to stand on becomes aggravated to complete 
groundlessness”; understanding things “for oneself” becomes a burden we no longer have 
to deal with, because das Gerede has presented us with a quite novel opportunity: “the 
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possibility of understanding everything without previously making the thing one’s own” 
(the possibility of understanding everything without having to try to understand it; 169). 
As Heidegger would write decades later, “with a worn-out language everybody can talk 
about everything” (WhD? 127).   
Such a line of reasoning allows Heidegger to show that the assertion, as a pointing 
out through predicating, holds within itself the possibility of being leveled-off to 
something we can simply pass around, a static presentation that, through time and word 
of mouth, rigidifies and then begins to decay. The original investigation and 
understanding required in order to form the assertion is left by the wayside, what is 
unique or peculiar in its presentation is cut away in favor of the average understanding, 
and eventually the assertion becomes a truism that, for all we know, might not even be 
true. Even further, this potential falsity might become so average, so wide-spread, and so 
common-sensical that, passed down from generation to generation, it gains the authority 
to, as Heidegger’s biggest example goes, “[sanction] the complete neglect” of an inquiry 
into Being (BT 2). For as his narrative of the history of ontology tells it, the Greeks 
originally asserted that “Being is presence” (ouisia), and the history of philosophy has 
merely been a “passing along” of this proposition which, rather than being grounded 
(explored, asked after, made intelligible), is left unexamined, assumed to be “the ‘most 
universal’ concept” and thus entirely “self-evident” (BT 3-4).  
With our attention now directed towards the Greeks we move away from the 
everyday Being of discourse to the way that the assertion becomes embedded in 
philosophy as the paradigm of language. For the Greeks, language is conceived in terms 
of the logos (assertion), and such an assertion is seen as one amongst an infinite number 
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of present-at-hand beings (beings in the sense of a subject with accidental properties), yet 
one with a particularly important capacity. As Polt summarizes,  
Heidegger’s story then, is that for the Greeks, language or discourse (logos) was 
one present-at-hand entity among others, which could become the object of study. 
Language, however, is a distinctive present-at-hand entity, from the Greek point 
of view, because it has the power to attribute a present-at-hand predicate to a 
present-at-hand object by forming assertions…. Greek logic takes such assertions 
as the paradigmatic expression of thinking, where thinking is understood as 
theorizing, or ascertaining what is present-at-hand. Greek grammar, in turn, is 
dominated by Greek logic. In this way, our traditional interpretations of language 
are pervaded by the unquestioned ancient interpretation of Being as presence at 
hand (66).   
 
Thus the very foundation of our language and the understanding of it that still 
rules today is indebted to Greek ontology’s founding of the “logical-grammatical 
conception of language” (66). Being, taken as presence (as the “permanence in the sense 
of enduring (ouisia),” EP 4), determines the Greek understanding of language and molds 
it in its own image. Said another way, “the whole logic that we know and that we treat 
like a gift from heaven is grounded in a very definite answer to the question about 
beings,” an answer Heidegger finds problematic (IM 28). To see why, we must look a bit 
more at the way in which Heidegger tells the story of the history of philosophy. 
“Philosophy proper”—that is, metaphysics—stands as the title of the Western 
philosophic tradition spanning from Plato to Nietzsche. According to Heidegger, this 
history is to be understood as a decline based in the neglect of the question of Being 
(what we will later be called the “epoche” and/or “oblivion” of Being,” AS 254). “That 
which the ancient philosophers found continually disturbing as something obscure and 
hidden,” Heidegger describes, “has taken on a clarity and self-evidence such that if 
anyone continues to ask about it he is charged with an error of method” (BT 2). By 
“reawakening an understanding for the meaning of this question,” Heidegger wishes both 
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to bring the question of Being to the forefront of philosophical concerns and to 
reinvigorate it with the sense of supreme mystery and obscurity it had for the ancient 
Greeks (BT 1). For it is this sense of awe, wonder, and necessity that has slowly decayed 
as metaphysics has “progressed,” and with its decay—Heidegger believes—have come 
potentially fatal consequences.  
Nonetheless, Heidegger does not wish to contest the Greek understanding of 
Being as presence. This, he believes, is simply an historical fact: Being is presence 
because that is what it was originally determined as. As he writes in the brief essay “On 
Time and Being,” “this character of Being has long since been decided without our 
contribution”—we are simply “bound to the characterization of Being as presencing” (6). 
Not wanting to contest this characterization, Heidegger instead wishes to look beyond it. 
As Mark B. Okrent maintains, Heidegger is searching for something “behind” Being as 
presence, for “the opening or clearing which allows Being as presencing to appear and 
manifest itself” (145). In a word, Heidegger wants to understand that which makes it 
possible for Being and beings to come-to-presence in the first place. He does not ask: 
“What is Being, since it isn’t presence?”, but rather “What is it that makes Being as 
presence possible? What accounts for the fact that beings and Being come-to-presence? 
What is the original domain in which Being as presence and beings as present can come 
to address us at all?” The answer to these questions, Okrent writes, is what Heidegger 
refers to as the “truth,” sense, or place “of Being” (145). We, however, will call this 
idea—using Okrent’s own description—the clearing (die Lichtung).5  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 I do not believe that Okrent is wrong to speak of the truth of Being in the way that he 
does. I believe it to be essentially analogous to the clearing. But, insofar as Heidegger 
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Given the schema that Okrent provides, we can see that there are three 
ontologically significant “tiers.” At the “bottom,” there are beings, any specific entity that 
is (whether it be as concrete as the laptop I am typing on or as abstract as the idea of 
beauty). Beings, however, are only insofar as they are grounded in Being—that is, 
insofar as they are present. Said differently, beings are possible only because of Being, 
because of presence in the first place. Even further, beings are possible as presence only 
because of something more original, more primordial that, as Heidegger says, grants 
presence. It is this original granting—the Es gibt Sein (there is, it gives Being)—that is of 
the utmost importance for Heidegger’s thinking after Being and Time, whether it be in the 
form of the truth of Being, the clearing, or the event (das Ereignis) that is itself the “it” 
that grants Being as presence.  
If one is not familiar with Heidegger, this schema probably strikes them as either 
utterly confusing or mere ontological sophistry. To abate this reaction—a reaction often 
based in misunderstanding yet nonetheless wielded as a criticism—we will need to take 
the time to again expand on Heidegger’s general conception of metaphysics, the tradition 
Heidegger links to ontology (and thus relevant to the three-tier schemata), before looking 
at the “final tier” Heidegger is interested in. As we will see, metaphysics is most 
concerned with the bottom tier, casts a quick glance to the middle tier, and is completely 
oblivious to the final tier (the clearing).  
“Philosophy,” Heidegger says unequivocally, “is metaphysics.”     
Metaphysics thinks beings as a whole—the world, man, God—with respect to 
Being, with respect to the belonging together of beings in Being. Metaphysics 
thinks beings as beings in the manner of a representational thinking that gives 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
explicitly rebukes his use of “the truth of Being” in his later years (instead always talking 
about the clearing), it seems far more appropriate to use the later.  
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grounds. For since the beginning of philosophy, and with that beginning, the 
Being of beings has shown itself as the ground (arche, aition, principle). The 
ground is that from which beings as such are what they are in their becoming, 
perishing, and persisting as something that can be known, handled, and worked 
upon. As the ground, Being brings beings in each case into presencing. The 
ground shows itself as presence. The present of presence consists in the fact that it 
brings what is present in each case in its own way to presence. In accordance with 
the given type of presence, the ground has the character of grounding as the ontic 
causation of the actual, the transcendental making possible of the objectivity of 
objects, the dialectical mediation of the movement of absolute spirit and of the 
historical process of production, and the will to power positing values (432). 
 
Philosophy is metaphysics. That is, philosophy is that which “thinks beings as a 
whole—the world, man, God—with respect to Being, with respect to the belonging 
together of beings in Being.” Being is for philosophy the ultimate factum, the 
fundamental principle—that which, as an enterprise whose essence consists in “giv[ing] 
grounds,” is the “deepest” of grounds, the ground that no longer needs to be further 
grounded. For what, metaphysics might ask, is more basic than the fact that something is? 
What is more fundamental to any being than its is-ness?  
As something that can be “known, handled, and worked upon,” beings first and 
foremost are. As beings, the fact that they are present is the most fundamental fact. If 
presence lacks, so does Being. Yet the notion of presence itself, the Greek ouisia, has 
taken on a variety of “type[s]” throughout its history, for “the present of presence [...] 
brings what is present in each case in its own way to presence.” Heidegger lists four 
“epochs” of this history and the ways in which presence showed itself: those of ancient 
Greek metaphysics following Parmenides, the period from Descartes through Kant, 
Hegel’s Science (and, vicariously, Marx’s dialectical materialism), and Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of the will to power. In each of these cases, the most fundamental aspect of 
beings showed itself in different lights, yielding vastly different understandings of the 
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world while still being based in the same basic thought (or so goes Heidegger’s 
narrative). For Heidegger, however, what is most essential is that in each of these 
determinations of presence, the Es gibt—the original granting and clearing of Being—
remains totally unthought. 
“What characterizes metaphysical thinking, which seeks out the ground for 
beings, is the fact that metaphysical thinking, starting from what is present, represents it 
in its presence and thus exhibits it as grounded by its ground.” The issue is this: that 
metaphysical thinking “[starts] from what is present”—it starts with this being that is, and 
deduces from it as its most universal fact that it is, that it is present. Thus when 
Heidegger asks “does metaphysics think Being itself?”, he answers confidently: “No it 
never does.”6 
By beginning with this or that being in particular and pointing to Being as such 
(presence) as its ground, the being is seen as grounded whereas Being itself has not even 
been thought about. The that-it-is of the being (the Greek proposition that Being is 
presence) is the most basic thing we might say about it, yet when metaphysics articulates 
it, the being is grounded and Being is left unheeded as the causa sui and a priori. 
Presence is appealed to, but only as the ultimate ground, and thus is never understood—in 
other words, the possibility of Being as presence never becomes an issue. “As long as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 “It thinks the being with a view to Being. Being is first and last what answers the 
question in which the being is always what is interrogated. What is interrogated is not 
Being as such. Hence, Being itself remains unthought in metaphysics, not just 
incidentally, but in accord with metaphysics’ own inquiry. By thinking the being as such, 
the question and the answer necessarily think on the basis of Being; but they do not think 
about Being itself, precisely because in the most proper sense of the metaphysical 
question Being is thought as the being in its Being. Inasmuch as metaphysics thinks the 
being on the basis of Being, it does not think Being as Being” (NIV 207).  
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Being of beings is thought as the a priori, that determination itself prevents any reflection 
on Being as Being” (NIV 208). 
It is metaphysics’ obsession with beings rather than Being (on top of the fact that 
it is oblivious to the issue posed by the clearing) that secures its downfall. Beginning with 
Plato and Aristotle, the spotlight shines solely on beings, and more importantly for our 
inquiry, the way these beings are talked about: true and false assertions. As was said 
earlier, “the whole logic that we know and that we treat like a gift from heaven is 
grounded in a very definite answer to the question about beings,” an answer that is 
problematic because it is not grounded in an answer to the question of the possibility of 
Being and beings (IM 28). As we know, this answer to the question about beings that 
shapes Greek logic also comes to dominate Greek grammar. Assertions thus became the 
paradigm example of language because they conform to the Greek understanding of 
beings. They are built around Greek ontology: they come in the form of a subject and a 
predicate because Greek ontology views beings as something present-at-hand (subjects) 
with present-at-hand properties (predicates).  
The form of the assertion, then, makes perfect sense—because the Greek 
understanding of beings pervades our thinking. One of the first things that we learn about 
language is that it is made up of subjects and predicates; or, as we can now say, that 
Being is made up of beings and their properties. This is what it means to say that the 
Greek answer to the question about beings is cemented in our thinking, guiding it at all 
times, and hence allowing none of us to see any sense in looking beyond it.  
However, in another sense, we have moved beyond the Greeks. While their initial 
logic and grammar might still pervade our thinking, their conception of subject and 
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predicates expanded, becoming the notion of subject and object, which sure enough 
caused modernity to be the age of “absolute [and] consummate subjectivity”—in other 
words, man’s total dominion over the world and all that’s in it (NIII 225). The Greeks 
simply provided the basic rubric that, through certain ontological and linguistic decisions 
during the course of history, has come to bolster a view of the world that Heidegger finds 
extremely problematic. To see why Heidegger views modernity so bleakly, we have to 
follow the history of the assertion from its Greek origin to its modern prevalence.    
Heidegger’s account of the history of philosophy from Anaximander to Nietzsche 
(that is, from the first thinker to the last metaphysician) varies slightly depending on the 
time from which it comes. The general outline is that the Pre-Socratics had an original or 
primordial (and thus better) understanding of the nature of Being that was modified by 
Plato and Aristotle. With these two figures, thinking looked away from Being and turned 
its attention towards beings, especially one particular being: man. Philosophy in turn 
became successively more subjectivist, concerned not with Being but man’s (the 
subject’s) perception of beings. This way of thinking was solidified by Descartes, who 
grounded the possibility for any knowledge whatsoever on the human subject and his 
power of representation. Reality itself here becomes characterized solely as what can be 
represented by a subject (the ego, the “I”): beings come to presence because I represent 
them to myself. “Representation,” as Heidegger writes, “comes to be the tribunal that 
decides about the beingness of beings and declares that in the future only what is placed 
before it in and through representation and thus is secured for it may be considered a 
being” (NIII 219). Finally, the authority of representational thinking gets pushed far 
enough to hold that the representational subject itself “proclaims the law of Being,” that 
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man is “the lord of beings” and his will—as Nietzsche’s will-to-power—has “absolute 
dominion” as “pure self-legislation” (NIII 224).   
This outline doubtlessly shaves Heidegger’s narrative down to an “average 
intelligibility,” but such is necessary to remain close to our central inquiry. What we 
should glean from this history is the fact that the logical-grammatical conception of 
language, based in Greek ontology, has been radicalized by the subjectivity established 
by Descartes. This progressive estrangement from the question of Being (and the 
clearing), alongside the increasing emphasis on the power of the rational subject, has led 
to an unprecedented state of affairs, according to Heidegger. The authority instilled in the 
subject has spread through the “public realm” and has come to be a “threat to the essence 
of humanity” (LH 222).  
…because it stems from the dominance of subjectivity, the public realm itself is 
the metaphysically conditioned establishment and authorization of the openness 
of individual beings in their unconditional objectification. Language thereby falls 
into the service of expediting communication along routes where 
objectification—the uniform accessibility of everything to everyone—branches 
out and disregards all limits. In this way language comes under the dictatorship of 
the public realm, which decides in advance what is intelligible and what must be 
rejected as unintelligible (LH 221). 
 
There can be seen an echo here of what we have learned about das Gerede, idle 
talk. Yet instead of speaking about gossiping, Heidegger is now speaking in terms of a 
technologically advanced society—not of passing the word along, but of “expediting 
communication.” In this sense, things have changed since Being and Time: World War 
Two had come and gone, Europe had witnessed more destruction at the hands of 
technology than had ever been seen in world history, and Heidegger was now thinking on 
a veritably apocalyptic scale. Language, addressed on a social and global level instead of 
the confines of the ontological analytic of Dasein, has “fallen out of its element” and has 
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begun to decay beyond the point of propositional logic as well as das Gerede—it is now 
merely a means of facilitating man’s unflinching command over nature and himself. 
Subjectivity (the authority of the subject) having been pushed to such an extreme, 
language has “[surrended] itself to our mere willing and trafficking as an instrument of 
dominance over beings” (223). From the kernel of the Greek’s ontology and its influence 
on their language, through the entrenchment of the subject-object relationship and the 
representational ego à la Descartes, language has become simply one of the supreme 
ways of subject-ing beings to suit our modern and—assuredly during Heidegger’s time, 
and perhaps even more so during our own—disastrous purposes.7     
Hence “the task of liberating grammar from logic” (BT 165). Grammar—the 
system and structure of any language—must be re-established “on foundations which are 
ontologically more primordial” (ibid.): they must be rethought in accordance with an 
answer to the question of Being that takes the clearing or the es gibt into account. The 
necessity of this rethinking stems from the progressive decay of language from the times 
of the Greek’s concern over the assertion to the modern trafficking and expediting of 
language. By finding its foundation not “in the ‘logic’ of this logos”—the assertion—but 
in a different “model” or “mode” of discourse, Heidegger believes language might be put 
back on track (ibid.). For as it stands, with language viewed only as a means for saying 
true things and expediting global communication in the most average of ways, it has lost 
even the possibility of saying something meaningful about Being, that which necessarily 
lies beyond average intelligibility. In this sense, Heidegger’s critique of our modern use 
of language is to say that it can no longer say anything of genuine meaning, it cannot pay 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 These “disastrous purposes” become clearer as the project continues. For a poignant 
example, see the discussion of “the Rhine” on page 42 (below).   
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heed to authentic experiences of an aesthetic, existential, or ontological nature. All it can 
do is pass along what makes sense to everyone without having to think much about it.  
However, Heidegger’s concern with re-founding grammar in Being and Time was 
to fade by the time of the “Letter on Humanism.” For here he does not speak of the 
liberation of grammar from logic, but of “the liberation of language from grammar” (LH 
218) What exactly this transition signifies, as well as what the difference between these 
two projects amounts to is hard to say. Perhaps this formulation is simply a symptom of 
the fact that, during these later years, Heidegger was much more comfortable talking 
directly about language (rather than speaking about it in terms of assertions and 
grammar). Or perhaps Heidegger realized that grammar was too deeply entrenched in 
Greek logic, and that only language “itself” could be salvaged. In either case, what is 
certain is the way this liberation is to be accomplished. Heidegger no longer wishes to 
find an “ontologically more primordial” foundation for language—for he has admitted 
that ontology itself is rooted in the “mistakes” of the Greeks. The liberation of language 
“into a more original essential framework” is now “reserved for thought and poetic 
creation” (ibid.) The duty of such thinking and poeticizing is to understand language as 
“the house of Being in which man ek-sists by dwelling, in that he belongs to the truth of 
Being, guarding it” (237). Put another way, the duty of such thinking/poeticizing is to 
uncover the interrelatedness of the relation between language as the house of Being and 
the “truth of Being”—the third tier on our ontological scale, what we prefer to call the 
clearing.  
Returning now to the idea of the clearing, it is likely that not only those of us 
unfamiliar with Heidegger have become skeptical. For there is indeed a sense of 
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mysticism creeping into Heidegger’s thinking, a mysticism that will pervade his thinking 
on language and Being for the rest of his life. Whether it truly is “mystical” shall be 
decided later on, but for now, what is important to acknowledge is that this supposed 
mysticism is part and parcel of Heidegger’s attempt to go beyond the metaphysical 
interpretations of language and Being. Man is not described as grasping or even 
understanding the truth of Being, but rather as belonging to it and guarding it. Language 
is not something man uses, but the place in which he dwells—and dwells not just in the 
sense of resides, but dwells in the sense if living, acting, thinking, belonging. Language is 
where man belongs—it is “the home of man’s essence” (237). To live that essence, for 
Heidegger, means to guard the clearing, the original well from which Being as presence 
emerges and is granted to us (no longer as active subjects grasping beings, but as Da-sein, 
Being-there amidst the clearing).  
Such thinking seems mystical to us, Heidegger might say, because what is 
intelligible has been predetermined by the tradition we have been thrown into. Thus the 
very fact that this thinking seems mystical (irrational) can serve to drive home our own 
embededness in the tradition Heidegger is attempting to overcome. Because this tradition 
determines what is intelligible, anything that tries to go beyond it will confront us as 
mysticism or irrationalism. Heidegger’s hope is that in this supposed mysticism, we will 
find the possibility of distancing ourselves from the familiar enough to realize that 
intelligibility is not an objective state of affairs but an historically constructed 
Weltanschauung.  
But how are we to find any truth in something that inherently seems foreign to us? 
How are we to see the “steps [that] were necessary in order to move into this new 
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position” when it seems as if “Heidegger simply jumped out of the tradition one day and 
forcibly started something new” with his ontological incantations (Biemel 66)? 
Heidegger struggled deeply with these questions throughout the course of his life, coming 
up with various answers over the years. In the “Letter on Humanism,” looking back at 
Being and Time and its public reception, Heidegger talks about the difficulty of trying to 
express an entirely new way of thinking to an audience submerged in metaphysics.  
In the poverty of its first breakthrough, the thinking that tries to advance thought 
into the truth of Being brings only a small part of that wholly other dimension to 
language. This language even falsifies itself, for it does not yet succeed in 
retaining the essential help of phenomenological seeing while dispensing with the 
inappropriate concern with ‘science’ and ‘research.’ But in order to make the 
attempt at thinking recognizable and at the same time understandable for existing 
philosophy, it could at first be expressed only within the horizon of that existing 
philosophy and its use of current terms.  
 
In the meantime I have learned to see that these very terms were bound to lead 
immediately and inevitably into error. For the terms and conceptual language 
corresponding to them were not rethought by readers from the matter particularly 
to be thought; rather, the matter was conceived according to the established 
terminology in its customary meaning. The thinking that inquires into the truth of 
Being and so defines man’s essential abode from Being and toward Being is 
neither ethics nor ontology (LH 258-9).  
 
The original hope that his use of familiar terms would be reinterpreted by readers 
according to the task of thinking—that they might form a bridge through which existing 
philosophy could “transcend” itself—did not become reality. Heidegger has since 
acknowledged the need of a change of strategy. Such a change comes in the form of the 
apparent “mysticism” we have been discussing, because Heidegger realized that the 
“bridge tactic” simply wouldn’t work for what he was attempting to do: “there is no 
bridge here—only the leap” (WhD? 8). The metaphor of a bridge or a ladder fails because 
there is no middle ground or intermediary rungs in the transition from metaphysics to 
“thinking.” The gap—an abyss—can only be crossed with a “leap.” 
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We could characterize this leap in many ways: as the leap from metaphysics to 
thinking; as the leap from man as the rational animal to man as Da-sein/Ek-sistence; as 
the leap from Being as presence to the clearing as the possibility of presence; as the leap 
from the logical-grammatical conception of language to language as poetic saying. All of 
these depictions go to show the all-embracing nature of the leap, the way in which it is a 
turn—thinking here of Heidegger’s infamous Kehre—in man’s relationship to Being, his 
relationship to himself, and his relationship to language; in short, his relationship with the 
world. Leading man to the precipice of the abyss—to the leaping point—is in this way 
the central aim of Heidegger’s thinking.  
By working through metaphysics we have taken the “negative” route. We have 
described Heidegger’s thoughts on language as they arise out of his ontologically based 
critique of metaphysics, the history of philosophy. While this might not always be the 
best path to get at what is unique in an idea, it has been necessary in order to pay heed to 
the very way in which Heidegger’s views on language formed. As I see it, one of  
Heidegger’s foremost concern with language is how it relates to the question of Being—
of whether it is stuck merely describing beings with assertions or whether it can be 
appropriated in a new way, a way that would give words to Being (rather than continuing 
to leave it in the backdrop). Only now that we understand (to some degree) the 
inauthentic relationship to language can we begin to understand an authentic relationship 
to language—just as Heidegger thought that we could only understand authentic Dasein 
only by beginning from Dasein in its everydayness. 
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II. The Leap from Metaphysical Language to Language as Poetic Saying 
 
           My hope is that we have followed Heidegger closely enough to say that we now 
find ourselves on the precipice of metaphysical thinking. We have seen the problems 
Heidegger finds both in the ontology of the ancient Greeks and the way in which the 
assertion has come to embody the tendency of modern man to be seen as the lord of 
beings who possesses absolute dominion over the world. In what follows, we will try to 
take the leap with Heidegger into a new kind of thinking—that is, a new relationship to 
language—as it is encountered in his understanding of poetry. While this focus will take 
us beyond our earlier remarks concerning metaphysics, the logical-grammatical 
conception of language we are now familiar with will consistently remain the backdrop 
from which Heidegger’s new thinking—along with our own—is moving away from.  
           Our guiding aim is to come to terms with what Heidegger means by poetic saying, 
what we understand in the terminology of Being and Time as language in an authentic 
sense. To try to curtail the radical nature of the leap as it would appear if we went directly 
from Being and Time to the 1950’s and On the Way to Language (e.g.), we will begin by 
taking a developmental approach, working our way through the 1930’s and 40’s before 
discussing the altogether new approach to language Heidegger develops in the last few 
decades of his life. We will begin, with the help of Walter Biemel, with “The Origin of 
the Work of Art” and how poetry is defined in the mid-1930’s. This in turn will require a 
brief consideration of Heidegger’s work concerning truth as the Greek alētheia 
(unconcealment/Unverborgenheit), for poetry is defined in essence as “a distinctive way 
in which truth comes into being” (OWA 202). After getting an idea of the relationship 
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between poetry, language, and truth as unconcealment, we will then be prepared for the 
attempt to follow the way to language Heidegger develops in the late 40’s and 50’s. 
Finally, after doing this, the present chapter will conclude by returning to the 30’s and 
40’s, looking at Heidegger’s work on Hölderlin to get a sense of the political background 
of his thinking about language (at least during this period).  
           We have seen that after the publication of Being and Time, Heidegger grew 
skeptical of the way in which he had approached his major question, the question of 
Being. The terminology he had used was “not rethought by readers from the matter 
particularly to be thought,” but rather only grasped through reducing them to the 
metaphysical distinctions they were (and, by extension, we are) familiar with (LH 259). 
In the admission that these terms “were bound to lead immediately and inevitably to 
error,” we see Heidegger affirm the need of a new approach. What this new approach 
consists in is the abandonment of the ontological analytic of Being and Time in favor of a 
new kind of writing and thinking that moves beyond merely reaffirming Being as 
presence and begins to uncover what lies behind it: the clearing. Thus both in the change 
of writing style or terminology and in the change of topic (from Dasein and temporality 
to the work of art, poetry, and truth as unconcealment), we see Heidegger attempting to 
move beyond the limitations he now recognizes in Being and Time to a new kind of 
speaking and thinking that is up to the challenge of understanding the clearing and man’s 
belongingness therein.  
“What comes to pass” in the work of art, and not the metaphysical treatise, is “the 
openness [die Lichtung] in whose open Being makes its appearance, shows itself” 
(Biemel 75). All art—which “is in essence poetry”—is thus “the saying of the 
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unconcealment of beings”: the founding of the clearing from which beings and Being 
come to presence (OWA 198). The work of art, thinking of poetry in particular but not 
exclusively, is here described in a somewhat similar fashion as discourse in Being and 
Time. Both serve as fundamental modes of disclosure, as modes of uncovering what 
beings are according to how they themselves manifest themselves (as opposed to how I 
represent them to myself). However, as we will see, the disclosure present in the work of 
art does much more than simply uncover beings: it uncovers a world, the vast web of 
connections and concerns that make Dasein what it is as Being-in-the-world. And, 
apparently even further, the poem in particular can say the unconcealment of beings (the 
clearing) itself. 
           To get closer to these modes of disclosure we turn to one of Heidegger’s 
examples. The first mentioned is a painting of a pair of peasant’s shoes by Van Gogh. 
Heidegger claims that this work is “about” the shoes as a piece of equipment, and that it 
conveys the being (essence, nature) of equipment as “reliability” (160). Thus when he 
says “the artwork lets us know what the shoes are in truth,” he means that the shoes, a 
piece of equipment, show themselves in unconcealment, manifest themselves in the clear 
light of day as essentially reliable. Such a showing or manifesting is, according to Being 
and Time, also what occurs in a true assertion: “The Being-true (truth) of the assertion 
must be understood as Being-uncovering,” as an uncovering of the entity spoken of “as it 
is in itself” (218). However, this connection soon fades when we understand what the 
work of art really does—it’s particular “mode” of Being-uncovering.  
           The work of art is not simply the uncovering of this or that being as it is; “Art is 
truth”—alētheia—“setting itself to work” (165). In the work of art, the being which 
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appears is secondary to the act of unconcealment itself, the “setting up” of a domain in 
which beings may appear as they are. The work of art discloses not only the being 
depicted but the world in which it dwells, the connections and associations it has for the 
wearer, the work and toil of the fields, the rhythm of manual labor. Simply put, “to be a 
work means to set up a world” (170). For Heidegger, such world-disclosure lies beyond 
the capacity of the assertion. The assertion, as a particular instance of uncovering a being, 
does not disclose a world; it is rather based in, derivative of, “grounded in the world’s 
disclosedness” and “possible only on the basis of Being-in-the-world” (BT 219-20). The 
work of art, on the other hand, is the instantiation (the setting up) of the “world’s 
disclosedness” itself.  
Thus in the work it is truth, not merely something true, that is at work. The picture 
that shows peasant’s shoes, the poem that says the Roman fountain, do not simply 
make manifest what these isolated beings are as such—if indeed they manifest 
anything at all; rather, they make unconcealment as such happen in regard to 
beings as a whole (181). 
 
           Beyond unconcealing something, the work of art forces unconcealment itself to 
the fore. It brings truth away from the correctness of assertions and towards the open 
clearing in which beings can appear at all, the open clearing at the basis of Dasein’s 
world disclosure. Such openness is vital for Heidegger because “only this clearing grants 
and guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings we ourselves are not, and access 
to the being that we ourselves are. Thanks to this clearing, beings are unconcealed in 
certain changing degrees.” 
           “And yet,” Heidegger continues,  
…a being can be concealed, as well, only within the sphere of what is cleared. 
Each being we encounter and which encounters us keeps to this curious 
opposition of presencing, in that it always withholds itself at the same time in a 
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concealment. The clearing in which beings stand is in itself at the same time 
concealment (178). 
 
           Hence Heidegger writes that “the clearing happens only in this double 
concealment”—and thus “the essence of truth, that is, of unconcealment, is dominated 
throughout by a denial” (179). This denial is “not a defect or a fault,” but rather an 
essential aspect of truth thought not as the logical correctness of a proposition, but as the 
clearing of unconcealment in which beings show themselves to us as much as they shirk 
away in darkness. Self-manifestation and hiddenness are two poles of a mutual “strife,” a 
perpetual push-and-pull that suspends man between truth and falsity (174). This “striving 
clearing” is a “‘primal phenomenon,’” that which not only makes the truth of assertions 
(as correctness and correspondence) possible in the first place, but that which first grants 
beings as present and Being as presencing (EPTT 442). 
           Walter Biemel helps clarify this idea of making-possible. In the case of assertions, 
“in order for [them] to conform with the thing, the thing itself must be in the realm of the 
open, appear as something manifest, be present” (74). That is, the thing that is pointed out 
must have already been available to the speaker, must have revealed itself either in the 
sense of clear self-manifestation or in some kind of concealment. That “wherein” this 
being is manifested (the clearing) is akin to “a medium that at each time lets certain 
determinate traits come to the fore so that the being is able to show itself according to the 
openness that has been achieved” (74).  
           It is this medium, this strife, this clearing that is at issue in the work of art. Yet 
while this strife can be set up in a Greek temple or a painting, it is only addressed head on 
(made the central issue) in poetry. “What poetry, as clearing projection, unfolds of 
unconcealment is the open region which poetry lets happen”; poetry lets the clearing 
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happen, it allows the possibility of presence to manifest itself as openness, hiddenness, 
denial, and the other ways we have mentioned. Poetry, as “the saying of the 
unconcealment of beings,” is not only the happening of truth, but the “founding of truth,” 
the establishment of the clearing and alētheia, that which has remained unthought in 
philosophy (198-9).  
           Now, in returning to our central concern, we must note that poetry and its 
distinctive capability are only possible on the basis of language itself. “Language,” 
Heidegger writes amidst his description of poetry,  
…by naming beings for the first time, first brings beings to word and to 
appearance. Only this naming nominates beings to their Being from out of their 
Being. Such saying is a projecting of clearing, in which announcement is made of 
what it is that beings come into the open as (198).  
 
           Yet such saying, Heidegger continues, “is poetry:” it is the saying of openness and 
concealment, “the saying of the arena of their strife”—the saying of the clearing (198). 
What, then, is the relationship between poetry and language? Are they even 
distinguishable?  
Language itself is poetry in the essential sense. But since language is the 
happening in which beings first disclose themselves to man each time as beings, 
poesy—or poetry in the narrower sense—is the most original form of poetry in 
the essential sense. Language is not poetry because it is the primal poesy; rather, 
poesy propriates in language because language preserves the original essence of 
poetry (199). 
 
           In distinguishing between language, poetry, and poesy, Heidegger talks of 
originality and essentiality. There is what he calls an essential sense of poetry, which 
language is and which poesy is “the most original form of.” Heidegger tells us that the 
essence of poetry is “the founding of truth” (199). Thus language is, subsequently, the 
“preserving” of the founding of truth, and poesy the most original form of such founding. 
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           As Biemel elaborates,  
For poesy to be possible, man must move in the realm of language, must disclose 
to himself Being through the medium of language. Within this domain poesy 
occupies a privileged position; it is expressly and exclusively dedicated to the 
disclosure of Being. Poesy completes what is set up in language, that at which 
language aims. The arts which do not realize themselves in the realm of language 
presuppose the disclosure of Being through language. ‘Each of them is a special 
poeticizing within the clearing of Being, which, wholly unnoticed, already came 
to pass in language’ (77). 
  
           Thus although Heidegger characterizes language on the basis of poetry, it is 
language itself—as the disclosure of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world—that is the truly 
“primordial” occurrence. “Where there is no language, […] there is also no openness”: 
for it is language that “alone brings beings as beings into the open for the first time” 
(OWA 198). Language, as such an original presencing, is “poetry in the essential sense” 
because it is what originally makes possible the clearing, what brings-to-presence that 
which is the concern of poetry (the clearing). Without language, without words, there 
simply would be no world to speak of—there would be no Dasein, no beings, and hence 
no Being.   
           This “ordering” of language and poetry is further grounded in a discussion near the 
beginning of the essay “…Poetically Man Dwells…”. Here, poetry is not described as the 
founding of truth, but rather as the founding of “dwelling”—what for Hölderlin stands as 
“the basic character of human existence.” As Heidegger writes, the title of the essay 
“says: poetry first causes dwelling to be dwelling. Poetry is what really lets us dwell. But 
through what do we attain to a dwelling place? Through building. Poetic creation, which 
lets us dwell, is a kind of building” (PMD 213). When we think dwelling in Hölderlin’s 
sense, this means that poetry, as a kind of building, is what allows humans to exist in the 
first place. Poetry is what lets man be who he is—hence he dwells poetically. “Poetry is 
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what first brings man onto the earth, making him belong to it, and thus brings him into 
dwelling”—into his essence (216).  
           However, this building still rests fundamentally on language. For “where do we 
humans get our information about the nature of dwelling and poetry?”—we “[receive] it 
from the telling of language.”  
For, strictly, it is language that speaks. Man first speaks when, and only when, he 
responds to language by listening to its appeal. Among all the appeals that we 
human beings, on our part, may help to be voiced, language is the highest and 
everywhere the first. Language beckons us, at first and then again at the end, 
toward a thing’s nature…. The responding in which man authentically listens to 
the appeal of language is that which speaks in the element of poetry (214).  
 
           It is language then, as “the highest and everywhere the first,” that grants humans 
access to the founding capabilities of poetry. Poetry, as a letting-dwell and thus as a 
bringing man into his essence, is only possible as a response to the original speaking of 
language. For man to build (which means for man to allow himself to dwell, which 
means for man to bring himself to his essential nature), he must first and foremost listen 
to the call of language, hear what language requires of him to say. Language is not 
grounded in poetry; poetry is rather the authentic response of man to language.  
           In the attempt to bring both of our descriptions of language and poetry together, 
we might say that poetry is the authentic response to language because its essence is to 
found truth, to bring about the clearing. Language calls on man to establish the clearing 
through poetry, for only through such a clearing might it “beckon us toward a thing’s 
nature.” Because it is “only this clearing” that “grants and guarantees to us humans a 
passage to those beings we ourselves our not, and access to the being that we ourselves 
are,” language requires poetry to found the clearing (OWA 178); but for poetry to found 
the clearing, “language needs and uses the speaking of mortals” (L 205). The clearing, 
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unconcealment, poetry, mortals—this is “the web of relations” that “language itself has 
woven us into” (WL 112).  
           Having brought the “web of relations” in which Heidegger demands language to 
be thought to the fore, we might stop to ask with Heidegger: “but is not all this unfounded 
mysticism or even bad mythology, in any case a ruinous irrationalism, the denial of 
ratio?” (EPTT 448). Perhaps. But to return to what we have said concerning mysticism 
thus far and allowing Heidegger the benefit of the doubt, we should note the anti-
subjectivist “effect” of his writing on the work of art, truth, and alētheia. Beings do not 
come to presence, as Descartes might say, through the representation of the thinking ego, 
but within the clearing where they can show themselves just as well as they can remain 
hidden. Dasein, as one being amidst the clearing, does not lord over what it encounters—
it does not have direct control over whether what confronts it shows itself from itself, 
shows itself only in its semblance, or refuses to show itself at all. With the ideas of the 
clearing and unconcealment, the authority of the rational subject is displaced in favor of 
what might be called, thinking of Charles Taylor’s essay “Heidegger, Language, and 
Ecology,” an ecological status of man: a view of man that does not put him above beings, 
but that finds him amidst them.  
           We might find objection to this de-authorizing of the subject insofar as Heidegger 
claims that language is that which first brings beings and Being to presence. For here, it 
seems that language is in control, and that language, as something man uses, allows him 
to maintain his absolute authority within this domain. Yet this objection quickly falls 
away when we remember that for Heidegger, language is not something man uses. As he 
writes in “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” almost repeating the words of “Poetically Man 
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Dwells” verbatim, “man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while 
in fact language remains the master of man” (348). For his part, “man first speaks when, 
and only when, he responds to language by listening to its appeal” (PMD 214).  
           But now, though the objection has fallen away, we find ourselves back in the 
enigmatic and mystical way in which Heidegger approaches language after the “Origin of 
the Work of Art.” What would it look like to speak by listening to the appeal of 
language? Where does this appeal come from and how are we to hear it? What does it 
mean to say that “strictly, it is language that speaks” (ibid.)? Is language here 
anthropomorphized? And if it is, does this mean that language simply comes to stand in 
as Heidegger’s causa sui?  
To try to make these cryptic remarks at all intelligible, we must attempt to enter 
into the web of language Heidegger has outlined. We must abstain from labeling this web 
as mystical or irrational prematurely in attending to the definitively strange approach 
Heidegger adopts in his later writings. Such attendance, however, will only go so far. For 
both at the heart and the fringes of Heidegger’s approach lie two “ideas” that, if looked at 
in detail, would take us too far from our focus and leave no time for our ensuing 
discussion of translation. These “ideas”—in quotation marks because they cannot be 
considered “concepts” in the philosophical sense—are the fourfold and das Ereignis 
(alternatively translated as Appropriation, Event, or Event of Appropriation). While these 
ideas are essential for Heidegger’s later thinking on language, for the sake of the current 
project, we will leave the fourfold completely to the side and only sketch das Ereignis in 
crude outline. What is most important for our purposes is, with this latter term as the limit 
of our investigation, to get a sense of how the relationship between language and man is 
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developed, as well as how language appears now even more radically anti-subjectivist 
than before.  
           In an essay titled “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry,” Heidegger explains what 
he sees as the true relationship between language and man.  
Being a means of making oneself understood does not constitute the essence of 
language…. Language is not merely a tool which man possesses alongside many 
others; rather, language first grants the possibility of standing in the midst of the 
openness of beings. Only where there is language, is there world…. Language is 
not a tool at man’s disposal, but that primal event which disposes of the highest 
possibility of man’s Being (HEP 56).  
 
           Thus as the clearing represents the possibility of Being, language represents the 
possibility of man. It is the “primal event” that allows him to be who he is in the most 
essential sense. “So that history may be possible,” Heidegger writes, “language has been 
given to man” (54). Man partakes in language, he is given language, but he does not own 
language. In a sense, he rents it. Language, as disclosing the world, also discloses history, 
the trajectory that has made that world what it is. Language, bringing beings to presence, 
allows us to encounter them, to be concerned with them, to let them surround us in the 
perpetual flux that is our world. Without language, man simply would not be who he is—
for it is language, as poetry, that first allows him to dwell. 
           Yet as the master of language, he is also estranged from his essence. Language is 
proffered to him, not so he can grasp it and wield it as a weapon, but so that beings can 
become intelligible to him, so that the world can become intelligible and so that 
intelligibility can be articulated amongst a shared community, a people. When man sets 
upon language as if he were the master of it, the essentially founding character of 
language, the power of words and their way of making-present, is covered over, along 
with the essence of those things described. Take, for example, Heidegger’s discussion of 
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the Rhine in “The Question Concerning Technology.” On the one hand, this word can be 
experienced poetically, as it is in Hölderlin’s hymn of the same name. On the other hand, 
this word can be experienced “technologically” (that is, in a modern way), which 
Heidegger describes as follows:  
The hydroelectric plant is set into the current of the Rhine. It sets the Rhine to 
supplying its hydraulic pressure, which then sets the turbines turning. This turning 
sets those machines in motion whose thrust sets going the electric current for 
which the long distance power station and its network of cables are set up to 
dispatch electricity. In the context of the interlocking processes pertaining to the 
orderly disposition of electrical energy, even the Rhine itself appears to be 
something at our command (321). 
  
When the word “the Rhine” is thought in this way, it is not allowed to come to 
language of its own accord: “what the river is now, namely, a water-power supplier, 
derives from the essence of the power station”—i.e., modern technology (ibid.). 
Modernity comes to define the river on its own terms, viewing it simply as something to 
be utilized, “set upon.” Our command over the word is now a command over the river. Its 
essential Being is reduced to the way it lends itself to our pursuit of earthly domination. 
All poetical experience of the word is expunged in favor of an experience that fits the 
orientation of modern man. In this way, the understanding of language as a distinctive 
mode of unconcealment is buried beneath technical or analytic interpretations of it as 
well as the global expediting of communication and the everyday passing-along of das 
Gerede. The only way to get back to it, so it seems for Heidegger, is to relinquish all 
sense of human authority and give the true weight of disclosure over to language, the 
master of man. Hence the invocation of language as an agent that speaks, and man as a 
being that must learn to listen. 
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           But is language truly conceived of here as an agent? What does it mean to say that 
“language speaks” (L 188)? To answer this question, Heidegger proceeds in a way that is 
unique to his later writings. Reasonably enough, Heidegger says that to know what it 
means for language to speak, we must know what speaking is. But by elaborating the 
nature of speaking, Heidegger seems forced into drawing out a seemingly unending chain 
of further definitions: speaking is saying, saying is showing, showing is gathering, 
speaking as saying as showing as gathering is owning. And even this chain fails to do 
justice to all the twists and turns Heidegger takes on his way to language, skipping over 
hearing, responding, answering, calling, presencing, etc.! The list truly goes on and on—
but it must be followed, Heideggger insists, if we are to truly see “the web of relations” 
that “language itself has woven us into.” Only such a path might allow us to see how 
“language itself brings itself to language”—how language manifests itself in 
unconcealment (NL 59).  
           Time does not allow us to follow these paths Heidegger walks in the essays 
“Language” and “The Way to Language” in their entirety. We must try to glean from 
them only what is essential in getting us from the idea of language speaking to the limits 
of our inquiry: das Ereignis.  
In another typical move of Heidegger’s later writings, Heidegger begins “The 
Way to Language” with the idea he wishes to go against. This idea, originating with 
Aristotle and reaching its peak in the philosophy of Wilhelm von Humboldt, is the 
common view of language as speech. Speech is herein conceived as an activity of man, 
the way in which he goes about showing the inner content of his mind/soul by means of 
the motions of the tongue, lips, vocal chords, etc. Writing, in turn, is the solidification of 
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speech, a representation of it by means of phonetic signs. Hence “the classical 
architectonic structure” of language can be summarized with three points: “The letters 
show the sounds. The sounds show the passions in the soul, and the passions in the soul 
show the matters that arouse them” (115).  
           There is one element this conception of language and Heidegger’s have in 
common. Both hold that language, as speaking, is a type of showing: language “makes 
something come to light, lets what has come to light be perceived, and lets the perception 
be examined” (WL 115). However, the showing Heidegger is interested in is not a matter 
of the passions in the soul; this understanding of speech “as expression” is something 
Heidegger hotly contests. For here one “already presupposes the idea of something 
internal that utters or externalizes itself. If we take language to be utterance, we give an 
external, surface notion of [it]” rather than getting at its essence (L 190). The division 
between internal and external, as part and parcel of metaphysical subjectivity ushered 
forth by Descartes, must clearly be steered away from.  
           The showing that interests Heidegger is not an activity of man, but the saying of 
language itself. Saying, as showing, is the “essential being of language” (WL 123). When 
Heidegger says that “language speaks by saying, that is, by showing,” he means that 
language exists essentially as the “clearing projection” we mentioned earlier. The saying 
of language establishes the clearing of unconcealment by “naming” beings, by “calling” 
them, by bringing “the presence of what was previously uncalled into a nearness” (L 
196). As the most primordial form of presencing, as “the keeper of being present” (WL 
135), as that which “alone gives being to the thing,” language provides a realm in which 
beings can be at home (NL 62). Language allows beings to dwell, to exist. It is in this 
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light we must understand Heidegger’s emphasis on the idea of language as “the house of 
Being” in his “Letter on Humanism” (236).  
           Because language is primordial presencing, the speaking of man must take the 
form of a listening. As Heidegger writes, “speaking is of itself a listening.” 
Speaking is a listening to the language which we speak. Thus, it is a listening not 
while but before we are speaking. […] We do not merely speak the language—we 
speak by way of it. We can do so solely because we always have already listened to 
the language. What do we hear there? We hear language speaking (WL 124). 
  
           Through his prioritizing of listening, we should see Heidegger as attempting to 
instantiate a shift in emphasis. Given the need to displace the power invested in the 
subject if the dangers of technology and global domination are to be avoided, we might 
say that Heidegger is using a kind of mysticism or irrationalism in order to affect a 
change in thinking that he believes cannot be attained in degrees, but is only possible 
through a fundamental transformation of (a “leap” away from) the modern day 
perspective of what man and language mean.  
           This description, however, is slightly misleading. Heidegger does not simply 
“utilize” a shift in emphasis as some kind of stylistic “tool” to affect a certain mindset in 
his readers; rather, the shift is a philosophical statement “in itself.” The shift, described 
above in terms of the leap, can be seen from many angles: as the shift from metaphysics 
to thinking; as the shift from man as the rational animal to man as Da-sein/Ek-sistence; as 
the shift from Being as presence to the clearing as the possibility of presence; as the shift 
from the logical-grammatical conception of language to language as poetic saying. The 
formulation “language speaks” is the attempted instantiation of such a shift. By listening 
to it, we hear a way in which man is not the master of language, in which language is not 
the ex-pression of something inner as something outer, in which man must listen and be 
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silent rather than speak and chatter. For with such views, “we close ourselves” off from a 
genuine relationship with our world. We identify things—a word Heidegger uses in his 
later career to mean beings encountered by humans in an “authentic” sense— “as context 
free objects, susceptible of scientific study,” or worse, as mere “standing reserve” at our 
disposal (Taylor 265). Such stances “abolish things” in the unique way that they are 
brought to light through the saying of language (ibid.). Given that these are our modern 
stances towards beings, human speech, as we said much earlier, must be brought back 
into its element. Speech must no longer be a tool for the subjugation of beings but rather 
a responding to what is said by language, a responding to what Charles Taylor calls the 
“telos of language.”  
Language, through its telos, dictates a certain…way of formulating matters which 
can help restore thingness…. If we stop to attend to language, it will dictate a 
certain way of talking. Or, otherwise put, the entities will demand that we use the 
language which discloses them as things. In other words, our use of language is no 
longer arbitrary, up for grabs, a matter of our own feelings and purposes. Even, 
indeed especially in what subjectivism thinks is the domain of the most unbounded 
personal freedom and self-expression, that of art, it is not we but language which 
ought to be calling the shots. This is how I think we have to understand 
Heidegger’s slogan ‘Die Sprache spricht’ [Language speaks], rather than as a 
proto-Derridean invocation of a super(non)subject (266).  
 
           For Taylor, “Heidegger’s slogan” should not be interpreted as the “subjectivizing” 
of language, as a way of making language an agent or super-subject (or even a 
“super(non)subject”). Instead, what the slogan accomplishes is a change in the way man 
is to relate to beings—and thus a change in the essence of man himself. This change is 
dictated by language. Language, in telling us what to say, tells us to restore beings to 
their thingness, in that it “beckons us […] towards a thing’s nature” (PMD 214). 
Language dictates that we attend to the unconcealment of beings, that we be “attentive to 
the way that language opens a clearing” (Taylor 263). Such attentiveness is not arbitrary, 
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but demanded by man’s own essence. For the clearing, though “it is not our doing,” 
“could not happen without us.” We are, to invoke Heidegger’s Ereignis, appropriated by 
language through “the part we play in the clearing coming to be” (ibid.). Called by 
language, bidden by language, even owned by language,8 man is not assigned “the major 
role that a creator would have, but a secondary one, helping it to happen, protecting and 
maintaining it. We have to ‘take care’ of Being, ‘spare’ it. The human agent is ‘the 
shepherd of Being’” (ibid.).  
           Thus we see once again the existential significance of language. For it is language, 
and only language, that “releases human nature into its own” (WL 129). Such releasing 
does not couple language with man and render him the animal with logos (rational 
animal), but establishes his role in accordance with the clearing and things. Man is not a 
particular animal endowed with the capacity for speech; man is the one who listens to the 
dictates of language. Man acts only insofar as he listens, insofar as he opens himself up to 
the way language dictates the saying of things, insofar as he allows beings to show 
themselves in words according to their own nature. In this realm, it is first and foremost 
das Ereignis that holds sway.  
Appropriation, in beholding human nature, makes mortals appropriate for that 
which avows itself from everywhere to man in Saying, which points toward the 
concealed. Man’s, the listener’s, being made appropriate for Saying, has this 
distinguishing character, that it releases human nature into its own, but only in 
order that man as he who speaks, that is, he who says, may encounter and answer 
Saying, in virtue of…the sounding of the word…. When mortals are made 
appropriate for Saying, human nature is released into that needfulness out of which 
man is used for bringing soundless Saying to the sound of language (WL 129). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Being called, bidden, and owned by language are all Heidegger’s own words from “The 
Way to Language.”  
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           I do not pretend to know all that Heidegger is trying to say here. It hinges on the 
word-play, also present in the English, that occurs between the use of the noun 
“Appropriation” (das Ereignis), the verb “to appropriate” (ereignen), and the adjective 
“appropriate” (eigen), and even a few more (die Vereignung, Er-äugen, vereignet). These 
terms, though they may seem to come out of nowhere, are linked to another key term we 
are already familiar with: authenticity, Eigentlichkeit. This link not only affirms a vital 
connection between Heidegger’s earlier and later writings, but also sheds light on this 
odd term in Heidegger’s late lexicon. The Appropriation, described elsewhere9 as the es 
gibt (the German equivalent of “there is” in English or “il y a” in French, literally the “it 
gives” that we have mentioned earlier) that “gives” not only language but also Being and 
Time (or, as ordered at this time, Time and Being), is the “primal event” beneath/beyond 
the “primal phenomenon” of the clearing. It is the ultimate limit of thinking, that which 
nothing lies beyond. As such a primal event, it determines what is proper to man, what is 
his own, what he authentically is. What is determined is that man belongs to the Saying 
of language, that man is who he is as that which brings “soundless Saying to the sound of 
language” in the “sounding word.” What is determined is that man is not the lord of 
beings, nor the master of language, but the shepherd of Being, the one who takes care to 
bring language to the spoken word, and to restore beings to their thingness in the 
authentic saying of poetry.   
           With this “explanation” we have not overcome Heidegger’s “language 
mysticism.” We have rather tried to embrace it. We have tried to listen to Heidegger—but 
from this fact alone we can never really be sure if we have heard him. For even he admits 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 On Time and Being, 1962.  
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that trying to characterize speaking in opposition to vocal utterance is like trying to break 
a spell that has been cast over all of humanity (L 194). As Nietzsche might say, we 
simply do not have the ears to hear language in this way. Such ears need to be developed, 
and this is what Heidegger’s later essays on language are supposed to accomplish. What 
matters most is moving us away from our “correct ideas about language”—that speech 
“is the audible expression and communication of human feelings,” an “activity of 
man”—towards a “way to language” that does not see language as it is cast in the shadow 
of the rational animal, but simply and only “as language” (L 190-1). 
           For now, we shall leave the question of mysticism, along with the “true” meanings 
of Heidegger’s slogan (language speaks) and das Ereignis, undecided. At this point, 
before moving to the issue of translation, we must turn back from the 50’s and 60’s to the 
30’s and 40’s, where language was not only of ontological, aesthetic, and existential 
significance, but of political significance as well. With this chronological shift, as well as 
the mentioning of politics, the elephant in the room must finally be dealt with: 
Heidegger’s involvement with National Socialism. As we will see, Heidegger’s political 
involvement did indeed have an influence on his understanding of language during these 
years. How pervasive and lasting this impact was, however, we leave to be determined.  
           As Robert Bernasconi writes, and as we have already partially seen, Heidegger’s 
approach to language throughout the 30’s and 40’s “was dominated by his relation to 
poetry.” But even further, “his relation to poetry was dominated by one poet, Friedrich 
Hölderlin” (146). During these years (and spanning well beyond them), Hölderlin 
appeared to Heidegger as a sort of “prophet,” as that poet on which the entire fate of 
humanity rested (147). There are a few reasons for this. For one, Hölderlin is “the poet 
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par excellence” because he not only poeticizes beings and the clearing, but “poeticizes 
the essence of poetry” itself (Biemel 78). In this respect, he represents a novel 
opportunity: he is the only poet who “can be questioned about” the essence of poetry 
(ibid.). Another reason, however, lies in his relationship with Germany and the German 
language. Heidegger indeed tells us in the “Origin of the Work of Art” that Hölderlin’s 
“work still confronts the Germans as a test” (203). Elaborating, Bernasconi writes that 
Hölderlin was for Heidegger the poet who, if the Germans decided in his favor by 
listening to the language of his poetry, could lead them to another place, a place 
where Western metaphysics no longer held sway. This is why Hölderlin was for 
Heidegger not one poet among others but a destiny for philosophy (146).  
 
Thus Hölderlin became a prophet both in what he revealed regarding the essence of 
poetry and in what he revealed about the German language and the German Volk 
(people). In short, Hölderlin was seen as a “destiny for philosophy” because what he was 
doing with poetry was what Heidegger was attempting to do with thinking: move it 
beyond metaphysics to another beginning—a German beginning.   
           To understand how Hölderlin might play such an historically revolutionary role we 
must look back to the “founding” nature of poetry/language. Now, because truth is for 
Heidegger not something universal and unchanging but rather an historical occurrence, 
the work of art not only grounds truth: it grounds history. In “the poetic projection of 
truth,” “truth is thrown toward the coming preservers, that is, toward a historical group of 
human beings” (OWA 200). This historical group draws its essence out of the founding—
the “bestowing,” “grounding,” and “beginning”—the work of art accomplishes (199). In 
opening up a world, the work of art has the potential to create a new historical destiny.  
           This is seen most clearly in Heidegger’s example of the Greek temple. Such a 
temple is not a mere building, but the opening of the Greek world.  
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It is the temple-work that first fits together and at the same time gathers around 
itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth and death, disaster and 
blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline acquire the shape of destiny 
for human being. The all-governing expanse of this open relational context is the 
world of this historical people. Only from and in this expanse does the nation first 
return to itself for the fulfillment of its vocation (167).  
 
           The Being of the Greek people opened itself up in the temple. The temple and 
what it stood for brought the Greek people together under a national identity, it 
established a culture. The work of art united an historical community, grounding 
everything from their daily affairs to their grandest concerns in the temple. Thus through 
the working of the temple, the Greeks came to be as a people. It is in this way that 
history, as “the transporting of a people into its appointed task,” as the assigning of a 
people’s essence, occurs in the work of art (200).  
           In the same way that the temple was essential for the Being of the Greeks, 
Hölderlin’s poetry—at least so Heidegger believes—is essential for the Germans. His 
work confronts the Germans as a test, a test of whether they can attain to the “appointed 
task” his work announces. The specifics of this task, however—what Hölderlin asks of 
the Germans and says concerning ideas like the Vaterland—are beyond our present 
concern. While we are familiar with ideas such as the German Volk and the Vaterland 
from their place within Nazi rhetoric, the exact implications of Heidegger’s political 
reading of Hölderlin are not entirely clear. While no one can deny that Heidegger 
endorsed many aspects of National Socialism, let it suffice it for us to say that what one 
finds upon a closer inspection of his involvement with Hölderlin is, as Richard Polt 
shows quite clearly, that his lectures are “engaged in an internal debate within National 
Socialism, siding against biological reductionism but still accepting the premise that a 
Volk needs a strong state, a state that establishes an ‘order of rank,’ rather than a liberal 
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society grounded on a social contract” (70). This reading is grounded in turn by the fact 
that, in 1939, Heidegger “renounced the terms blood, soil, Volkstrum, and Reich,” stating 
that these had nothing to do with being German in the sense Hölderlin projected 
(Bernasconi 153). Thus while Heidegger’s reading was undoubtedly politically charged, 
it presented a certain kind of National Socialism that shunned recourse to biological 
reductionism, instead promoting a kind of “cultural/philosophical” superiority of the 
Germans, a superiority that was to be maintained by a “strong state” that could avoid 
what many Germans saw as the complete failure of the Weimar Republic.  
           Now, if this superiority was seen to be manifested most clearly in any one thing, it 
was the German language. In fact, Heidegger was to later justify his defense of Germany 
throughout the 1930’s by attributing it not to a defense of the Nazi regime but to a 
defense of the German language (Bernasconi 156). Thus to both repeat and expand, 
Heidegger’s argument for the superiority of the German people finds its most essential 
expression in what we might call the philosophical potential of the German language. As 
Heidegger had written in the early 30’s, “along with the German language, Greek (in 
regard to the possibilities of thinking) is at once the most powerful and the most spiritual 
of languages” (IM 62). It is interesting that even here, when the Greek language is the 
principal concern, it is described “along with” German, as if German held a superiority 
even over the Greek Heidegger was so infatuated with.  
           What accounts for such power and spirituality? Given Heidegger’s refusal to 
expand upon the meaning and justification of such attributes, it is fairly easy to see them 
merely as a product of the times, either as a reflection of Heidegger’s nationalistic 
sentiments or as a way of investing such sentiments with a philosophical significance. 
	   53	  
The truth is that we will never know for sure whether Heidegger’s views were simply 
fabricated in the effort to veil his political beliefs in philosophical profundity, or whether 
such views arose genuinely from thoughtful consideration. The motives of Heidegger’s 
understanding of the plurality of languages aside, it is undeniable that he did come to 
understand such plurality as a hierarchy, a hierarchy whose means of measurement 
consists in a language’s “proximity to Being,” the particular way in which it is better 
suited for an inquiry into Being (Cassin 10). What constitutes greater or lesser proximity, 
however, is a far murkier issue. For as is typical of Heidegger’s statements regarding 
particular languages, the claim of superiority comes as more of an assertion than as an 
argument. For example, to say that the Greek language is philosophical (i.e., as compared 
to languages which are less or not at all philosophical) is not to say “that Greek is loaded 
with philosophical terminology,”  
But that it philosophizes in its basic structure and formation. The same applies to 
every genuine language, in different degrees to be sure. The extent to which this is 
so depends on the depth and power of the people who speak the language and 
exist within it. Only our German language has a deep and creative philosophical 
character to compare with the Greek (EF 36). 
 
           As the last sentence confirms, the final say as to the philosophical “level” of a 
particular language does not rest on an argument but on a claim of depth and creative 
potential. The only thing to ground this is the implicit claim that the German people—
that which the German language depends on for its depth and power—are indeed deep 
and powerful. Thus we arrive back at the seemingly undeniable fact that Heidegger’s 
hierarchy of languages depends on his particular political affiliations and nationalistic 
inclinations.  
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           There is only one thing that speaks against this, that, in other words, provides an 
argument for Heidegger’s hierarchy: namely, the claim that the philosophical capacity of 
a particular language does not lie in the amount of its philosophical terminology, but in 
its “basic structure and formation.” But this, of course, leads directly to another question: 
how do we determine whether the structure and formation of a language is or is not 
philosophical? Heidegger responds to this question only indirectly. For example, in the 
Introduction to Metaphysics, philosophical capacity seems to lie in certain grammatical 
characteristics of Greek and German absent from other languages. In the context of 
Greek, such structural advantages appear to be rooted in what we have already seen: the 
fact that the Greek language is pre-determined by Greek ontology, a pre-determination 
that renders the Greek language uniquely suited to philosophical thinking. Given this, 
determining the philosophical potential of German would appear to require a lengthy 
linguistic investigation coupled with historical and philological research—a requirement 
we do not have the time or the means to heed.  
           Thus to conclude, we are left with two ways in which we could respond to 
Heidegger’s claim as to the superiority of the German language. First, we could take the 
path just mentioned, embarking on a historical-philological quest through the German 
language. Second, we could take Cassin’s diagnosis at face value, accepting that 
Heidegger’s privileging of the German language is more or less a symptom of his 
political beliefs, evidence of “ontological nationalism”—“the worst kind of 
Heideggerianism, that is, Hellenico-Nazism” (10-11). Given the sheer impossibility of 
grounding Heidegger’s “argument” according to his own writing (that is, given the fact 
that he never provides us with a means of substantiating his argument aside from our own 
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philological conjectures), as well as the unavoidable fact of Heidegger’s nationalist 
sentiments, we will provisionally accept Cassin’s claim. Unless another opportunity 
presents itself, we will acknowledge that Heidegger’s favoring of the German language 
can be understood only as an expression of his nationalism, regardless of the 
philosophical considerations surrounding such expression.  
           Accepting that some of Heidegger’s ideas about language can be understood 
through a political lens, however, does not entail throwing all that he says into doubt. As 
Cassin writes, Heidegger’s view is indeed a “worst-case scenario.” Still, it can only be a 
worst-case scenario by following a vital starting point in a wrong direction. Thus for our 
purposes, what is most important is that Heidegger begins with an assumption with which 
both Cassin and I agree: namely, that language is plural, that each language comes with 
its own “historical spirit,”, and thus that language is only truly encountered when it is 
seen in its inherent multiplicity (HHdI 62). As Cassin explains,  
…We philosophize in languages with words and not universal concepts…. The 
philosophical point is that languages perform different worlds. The political point 
is not to see language as a simple means of communication—as when one 
language (English?) is seen as a universal language of communication. At that 
point it is no longer a language at all; it’s no longer English. We philosophize in 
words and not in concepts: we have to complicate the universal with languages 
(11).  
  
           It is noteworthy that, while arguing against Heidegger’s conclusions, Cassin 
explicitly echoes Heidegger’s understanding of language. The points she wishes to make 
are exactly what we have already seen to be at the core of Heidegger’s thinking: the 
affirmation of language as the disclosure of a world and the rejection of language as 
communication. The fundamental fact for Cassin—and, as I would argue, for 
Heidegger—is that “language is and is only through the difference between languages” 
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(249). If language is seen only as a tool, as a means for communication, then we risk 
missing the inherent plurality of language in favor of the mere utility of a universal 
language, what Cassin calls “Globish” (253). For Heidegger and Cassin, metaphysics and 
ontology represent a grave danger, if not the gravest danger, because their way of 
understanding language misses exactly what they see as most essential. The philosophical 
demand for the preservation of the “univocality” of language—for the fact that this word 
signifies this thing and nothing else (because only so can we come up with fully “clear 
and distinct” categorizations)—is nothing other than the demand that metaphysics 
deceives itself as to the true nature of language in order to preserve the possibility of 
clarity it has already established as its ideal (250). In short, metaphysics lies to itself 
about language in order for it to arise. In response, Heidegger and Cassin try to tell the 
truth about language, in order for a new kind of thinking to arise.             
           Given all of this, we who wish to follow Heidegger’s way to language should 
perhaps put our condemnation of ontological nationalism in brackets in order to see what 
the acknowledgment of a plurality of languages and historical spirits gave or could give 
rise to other than a hierarchy of languages. For our purposes, the most important 
consequence of acknowledging the plurality of languages is clear, a consequence 
thoroughly developed by Heidegger: the necessity of translation.  
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III. Translation and the “Original Contents” of Language  
 
           Before we get to translation, a reminder of our initial goals and intentions is called 
for. In our introduction, we said that our investigation into language is meant to clarify 
the imperative Heidegger gives Wisser in their interview. The imperative goes as follows:  
And it requires a new attentiveness to language, not the invention of new terms, as 
I once thought, but rather a return to the original contents of our own language as it 
has been conceived, which is constantly decaying (PR viii).  
 
           At this point, while we may not have a procedural prescription for attending to 
language in the way Heidegger intends, we have at least a general sense of what he 
means. Such attentiveness signifies a new way of relating to language, a way that 
abandons the metaphysical definition in favor of a more humble (if not for that reason 
less difficult) stance, a stance that seeks to listen to language, to hear what it demands of 
us, and to attend to such demands. Uncertain of its exact orders, we at least know that one 
of them is not the invention of new terms, the establishment of a new terminology that 
somehow might bridge the gap between metaphysics and an entirely new kind of 
thinking. In other words, we know that approach developed in Being and Time is off of 
the table.  
           Furthermore, we have a general understanding of what Heidegger means by the 
decadence of language. Such decadence is found in the view of language that takes it as a 
tool for communication, a view that at its most extreme completely denies the plurality of 
languages in favor of harnessing the power of Globish and establishing total dominance 
over the world and all that is in it. In what we have learned in our first two chapters, it 
seems that the route to combatting such decadence comes in the form of Heidegger’s 
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mystical demands to “listen to” and “speak from out of” language. Alternatively, there 
seems to be a way of curtailing the decline of language through a certain kind of attention 
to Being, an attention in line with the three ontological tiers we have discussed.  
           These routes, however, do not exist in opposition to each other. Rather they are 
united, inseparable; in fact, they are alternative descriptions of the same path, that which 
leads “beyond metaphysics.” In the last part of our original quotation that we have yet to 
consider, Heidegger gives us one more way of describing this path. Here, the way to 
combat the continually growing decadence of language is described as “the return to the 
original contents of our language as it has been conceived.” In combining these three 
descriptions, we may characterize the path to overcoming metaphysics as a return to the 
original contents of our language that, by listening to language and developing a new 
relation to Being, finally learns to “speak from out of language.” The way in which such 
a path is followed—in other words, the process in which all of these attributes are 
subsumed—is, we shall see, none other than the act of translation.   
To begin understanding this act in Heidegger’s sense, let us look to a few remarks 
Heidegger makes about translation in a lecture on Hölderlin. Although the lecture is 
meant to provide an interpretation of one of Hölderlin’s hymns, we are struck fairly early 
on with what appears to be a massive digression as Heidegger sets about meticulously 
analyzing a section of the choral ode in Sophocles’ Antigone. The central term he 
identifies in lines 333-4 is the Greek to deinon, which he chooses to translate as “the 
uncanny” (das Unheimliche). “Yet who decides,” Heidegger asks, “and how does one 
decide, concerning the correctness of a ‘translation’?”  
We ‘get’ our knowledge of the meaning of words in a foreign language from a 
dictionary or ‘wordbook.’ Yet we too readily forget that the information in a 
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dictionary must always be based upon a preceding interpretation of linguistic 
contexts from which particular words and word usages are taken. In most cases a 
dictionary provides the correct information about the meaning of a word, yet this 
correctness does not yet guarantee us any insight into the truth of what the word 
means and can mean, given that we are asking about the essential realm named in 
the word (HHdI 61-2). 
 
To make sense of this last claim we must not only realize its ground in 
Heidegger’s acknowledgment of the plurality of languages, but also understand the 
relevance of Heidegger’s persistent separation of truth as correctness and truth as 
unconcealment. The definition of a word found in a dictionary is “correct”: it is, from at 
least one angle, the “true” meaning of the word. But herein lies the problem: this 
correctness takes itself to be “an absolute authority,” but is in fact only one way this word 
can be understood—merely one way it becomes intelligible given a specific and 
contingent “preceding interpretation of linguistic contexts” (ibid.).  
This ambiguity of definition is quite familiar to us. Think, for example, of the 
English word “break”: one can say “I broke my leg,” or “Break a leg!,” or “Let’s take a 
break,” or “What a lucky break!,” and so on. In each of these phrases the word “break” 
means something totally different. Still, a dictionary can fairly easily handle such 
difficulty simply by listing all the definitions that are relevant. The words that Heidegger 
is interested in have a different kind of ambiguity, an ambiguity that seems to resist all 
attempts at translation. Good examples are words that a foreigner simply leaves 
untranslated in the foreign language. In English we sometimes use the French ennui, 
meaning a feeling of listlessness or melancholy. We leave this word untranslated, 
however, because the English words we use to make sense of it do not seem to fully reach 
“the essential realm named in the word.” If a friend is unfamiliar with the term, the 
dictionary definitions of words like listlessness or melancholy may very well provide 
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them with “pointers as to how to understand [the] word,” but none of these pointers will 
truly capture what the French word says (ibid.). Rather, they will always be mere 
indications of how the French word is to be brought into the “conceptual domain” of the 
English language. 
It is this last issue that Heidegger is concerned with. That is, the essential problem 
of translation is that “every translation must necessarily accomplish the transition from 
the spirit of one language into that of another” (62). For Heidegger, “there is no such 
thing as translation if we mean that a word from one language could, or even should, be 
made to substitute as the equivalent of a word from another language” (ibid.). The 
“essential realm named in the word” cannot be accessed by dictionary definitions, for 
definitions do not pay heed to the spirit of the language in which the word resides and 
becomes intelligible.10 The idea of a “literal translation” is, for Heidegger, a total fallacy: 
the essence of a word remains embedded in the specific way of speaking/thinking of an 
historical people (later, we will see this idea echoed in Heidegger’s distinction between 
words and terms).  
It seems that we have two ways to respond to such a belief. Either we can dismiss 
it as an outgrowth of Heidegger’s controversial nationalistic and racial tendencies, or we 
can try to see whether we experience such a division between languages ourselves. While 
it is clear that this view could lend itself to radically racist sentiments, on a closer 
inspection of the deep-seated ambiguity of some words, one finds that it is also 
undoubtedly true. A somewhat superficial example can be found in the difference 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The closest approximation of a definition can only come from a praiseworthy work like 
Cassin’s Dictionary of Untranslatables, an effort I believe Heidegger would (or at least 
should) have admired. 
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between the French fraternité and the English fraternity. While they appear as literal 
equivalents and have the same etymological roots, when a Frenchman hears this word, it 
resonates as a fundamental part of the French ethos, whereas when an American hears 
this word, the first thing that comes to mind is a college Frat House. A more profound yet 
also less explicit example might be that between the French liberté and English liberty: 
for both, the word signifies freedom from unjust rulers. But where the American might 
think of the freedom entailed in something like the Second Amendment, the Frenchman 
might imagine the Declaration of the Rights of Man, or more radically, the potential 
threat of a freedom that dissolves into a reign of terror.  
What these examples show is that, as we have learned from Cassin, “different 
languages perform different worlds” (11). In acknowledging that language is both 
essentially historical and essentially plural, Heidegger and Cassin realize that the 
possibility of a literal equivalency between languages—a possibility translators and 
students of foreign languages often expect and rely upon (given different languages 
etymological cross-overs)—is barred from the start (Cassin 11). The point, then, is that 
our culture and tradition play an undeniable role in the way we think and the way we 
relate to language. So thoroughly embedded in the way of thinking/speaking that is 
familiar to us, we must admit that “all translating must be an interpreting” (ibid.). For 
Heidegger, when we translate a foreign word, we drag it into the realm of the familiar, 
into what is already intelligible (we interpret it).   
Translation, as a venturing outside of where one feels at home, will always fail 
when one does not truly enter into the spirit of the foreign language, but merely steps 
outside to snatch the foreign word and quickly transport it to the shelter of familiarity. 
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When the foreign word is hoarded in this way, its meaning is lost: what is hoarded is not 
the foreign word at all, but rather a familiar interpretation. What is needed is the 
willingness to let oneself dwell in unfamiliar territory. As Heidegger writes, we must 
awaken an understanding of “the fact that the blind obstinacy of habitual opinion must be 
shattered and abandoned” if the essence of a word “is to unveil itself” (63). 
Yet how is it possible that the translation of the Greek to deinon as das 
Unheimliche does not force the Greek word under the obstinacy of habitual opinion or the 
spirit of the German language? Doesn’t the use of this word imbue the Greek with a host 
of unintended German connotations? To respond to these concerns we simply have to 
acknowledge the fact that for Heidegger, “translating does not only move between two 
different languages, but there is a translating within one and the same language” (62). In 
other words, the German word must not be understood according to what is customary, 
but rather be treated with the same attentiveness required of a word in a foreign language. 
Because “all translating must be an interpreting” and “every interpretation […] is a 
translating,” what is required in both does not fall away with the appeal to a word of 
one’s mother tongue—for this language might in fact be as distant from our 
understanding as a foreign one.     
 Therefore, although Heidegger translates this word into German, he is still able to 
venture into the unfamiliar realm of the Greeks. Insofar as interpretation/translation is for 
Heidegger a creative and transformative act, simply leaving Sophocles’ word 
untranslated is not an option. By using the German Unheimliche, Heidegger “goes 
beyond what is expressed in the Greek”: this word does not simply reiterate the various 
meanings to deinon had and bind them together, but instead “grasps the concealed unity 
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of the manifold meanings of to deinon, thus grasping the deinon itself in its concealed 
essence.” Because of this, “the translation is incorrect”—not what was “literally” 
intended by the word in all of its various usages, nor what would be found in a Greek-
German dictionary—yet also, “on that account,” “more true” (64, italics added).  
Here is not the place to push further into why and how this translation is both 
incorrect and true, for much more would have to be said regarding Heidegger’s analysis 
of the choral ode in Antigone and Hölderlin’s Der Ister than is necessary given the goals 
of the present project. The two key lessons are, first, that translating a word from a 
foreign language into one’s own does not necessarily entail recourse to familiarity—that 
the essence of translation still exists in the process of attentively interpreting a word of 
one’s own language. Secondly, we learn that “translation is never merely a technical 
issue but concerns the relation of human beings to the essence of the word and to the 
worthiness of language” (ibid.). For Heidegger, translation is not a matter of pure 
calculation or philology (although philology often plays a role), but of who man is as an 
historical, cultural, and linguistic being. The meaning of “elemental words” cannot be 
reached with formal definitions, but can only come about when we “undergo an 
experience with language”—when we “let ourselves be properly concerned by the claim 
of language by entering into it and submitting to it.” Only then, when language truly 
“befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms and transforms us,” will man be in a 
position to realize “the proper abode of his existence in language” (NL 57, italics added).  
From our discussion of Heidegger’s lecture on Hölderlin, we have learned that 
translation is not simply a process of mediation between two languages, but a potentially 
vital source to shed light on one’s own language. Heidegger goes even further, saying 
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that although one essential aspect of translation is its ability to open up a foreign world 
and thus a foreign way of thinking, “translation is more an awakening, clarification, and 
unfolding of one’s own language with the help of an encounter with the foreign 
language” (65-6, italics added). In other words, through the process of translation, what 
comes to pass is a “clarification” of one’s mother tongue by means of distancing oneself 
from it. The translator, in thinking through the foreign language and what it is attempting 
to say, is forced to adopt a new position in regards to their own language, to take a step 
back from what is and has always been totally familiar. That is, the translator must not 
only leap into an entirely foreign way of thinking, but from here, leap back from the 
foreign word into their own language. If the translator is to translate “authentically”—if 
they are to preserve what is unheimlich in the foreign language—they must struggle to 
maintain this distance, to find a way of speaking the familiar language (of leaping back 
into it) in a profoundly uncommon and unfamiliar way.  
If it has not already become clear, this distance from the familiarity of one’s own 
language that must be maintained in translation is not confined to this issue alone; in fact, 
it might be “defined” as the essence of Heidegger’s “style,” especially if we wished to 
identify an essence that spanned from his earliest years to his last. This “style” shows 
itself in the fact that almost everything he ever wrote takes as its title a few words that, 
even by the end of the “work,” have not been resolved in their essential meaning—even 
though this was the central goal. In this we see once again how deeply fascinated 
Heidegger was by words: by what they could say, by how they evolved, and by the 
unfathomable breadth of their sources and resources. For all that, he never wished to give 
“definitions”: words, for Heidegger—as we will see shortly—are “wellsprings,” 
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wellsprings that “are found and dug up in the telling, wellsprings that must be found and 
dug up again and again,” wellsprings “that easily cave in” (WhD? 130). For Heidegger, 
the essential path toward seeing words in this way entails neither arbitrary redefinitions 
nor the invention of new terms, but instead, as he told Richard Wisser, a return to words’ 
“original contents.”  
On this note, remembering that our goal is not only to illuminate the role of 
translation in Heidegger’s thinking, but even further, to interpret and understand the 
quote with which we began, I believe it is necessary to take a slight detour before we turn 
to “Anaximander’s Saying” and the issue of translation “proper.” With the last part of 
Heidegger’s words to Wisser that we have come to encounter now our main concern, we 
must begin by recognizing that the “original contents of language” are not only at stake in 
the matter of translation or in regards to early Greek thinking, as if “original” were 
synonymous with “ancient.” For while there is a temporal element to Heidegger’s 
understanding of “original language,” and while it is intimately related with etymological 
and philological considerations, by telling Wisser that we must develop a new 
attentiveness to “the original contents of our own language” (PR viii, italics added), we 
must understand Heidegger to mean that every language has original contents: namely, its 
archaic roots, its antiquated spellings, its outdated (and thus superseded) meanings, etc.  
Nonetheless, given our subject matter, it seems most appropriate to begin our 
discussion of the “original contents” of language in its German form. Some good 
alternatives to our exemplary text might be “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” in which the 
German Bauen (building) and Wohnen (dwelling) are brought to language from our of 
their original contents, or The Principle of Reason, where the same occurs (although to a 
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lesser philological degree) with words like Grund (ground, reason) and Satz (principle, 
sentence, leap). Instead of these options, we choose Was heisst Denken?, and for two 
main reasons. The first is the ambiguity present in the title itself, an ambiguity that both 
propels the entire lecture series and has led to my decision to leave it untranslated. On the 
one hand, the title takes the form of the common German question Was heißt…?, which 
asks after the meaning of the ellipses: “What is … called?”; “What do we call by the 
name …?”;  “What does that which goes by the name of … mean?” On the other hand, it 
may be rendered as “What calls for thinking?”, as in the question “What is it that calls on 
us to think”?; “why do we think?” The ambiguity met with in trying to translate the title 
into English is not lost on Heidegger (nor in German). In fact, he goes even further, 
elaborating the question in four distinct ways, all which let Denken—“thinking”—
“[emerge] from different sources of its essential nature” (163). Thus from the title alone, 
we get a sense of the radical ambiguity of language, even when it is in the form of a 
seemingly simple, three-word question.  
The second (and more important) reason we choose this lecture series comes from 
the (relatively) short (and thus more easily presentable and digestible) way in which what 
Heidegger means by original contents of language comes to the fore. In the third lecture 
of the second part (the lecture series took part over two semesters), Heidegger rather 
succinctly tries to show how thinking can be “better” understood—i.e., understood more 
originally—by thinking through its linguistic history (original contents). By putting 
“thinking” in dialogue with the “Old English thencan” and “thancian, to thank,” as well 
as a more original interpretation of “memory” (and its role in thinking), Heidegger 
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demonstrates what we are ultimately after: an attentiveness to the original contents of 
language.  
As we said above, Heidegger parses out the title question into four separate 
questions. It is in the context of the first question—that which asks after what the word 
thinking says (“What is it to which the word ‘thinking’ gives a name?” 127)—that the 
original contents of the word “thinking” become significant. In typical Heideggerian 
style, the word is not simply restored to its original signification with a few strokes of the 
pen, but is meticulously sketched out against the background of key aspects of 
Heidegger’s understanding of language. Although some of what follows may seem 
repetitive, and although it may seem like we are taking a step back from the question of 
translation, this step is helpful and perhaps even necessary in the new light that it sheds.  
In response to the question of what “thinking” names, Heidegger says, “what 
comes to our minds here is at first fleeting and blurred. Most of the time, we can leave it 
at that. It satisfies the demands of common speech in usual communication.” In the terms 
we have become familiar with, the most immediate and common understanding of words 
represents solely their “average intelligibility,” understandings that are both satisfactory 
for everyday communication and suited to the tendency of das Gerede, “idle talk.” Such 
communication, he continues, “does not want to lose time tarrying over the sense of 
individual words. Instead, words are constantly thrown around on the cheap, and in the 
process are worn-out”—in other words, they decay. As we have seen, this presents a 
particular advantage for everyday Dasein: for “with a worn-out language everybody can 
talk about everything” (127).   
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Behind this everyday communication and its “pitfalls” lies the traditional and 
metaphysically determined ways of speaking/thinking we have familiarized ourselves 
with in our first chapter. Here, language is seen as a tool, as a practical means of 
expression and communication by means of assertions (“common speech merely employs 
language,” 128). In this way, we think of words (Worte) as “terms” (Wörter), uttered 
sounds/written letters to which definitive meaning is accrued by the speaker (in other 
words, we view words in terms of sign and signified).11 In the common view of language, 
words—as terms—“are like buckets or kegs out of which we can scoop sense,” canisters 
that are either full and meaningful or empty and irrational (129). 
As we know, this understanding of words and language is the outgrowth of the 
initial contributions of the Greeks, specifically those of Plato and Aristotle. For them, 
speech (logos)—as embedded ontology of the present-at-hand—was seen through the 
paradigm of the assertion, i.e., language in terms of the grammar of subjects and 
predicates. In Was heißt Denken?, Heidegger adds that this understanding of logos 
determined how “thinking” was, has been, and still is understood as: “Logic, as the 
doctrine of the logos, considers thinking to be the assertion of something about 
something. According to logic, such speech is the basic character of thinking” (155).  
Logic, however, rests upon the stability of its assertions, a stability affirmed 
through syllogistic reasoning (i.e., through other assertions). But as Heidegger is able to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Both Worte and Wörter are plural forms of the German Wort (word). Using one over 
the other in spoken/written German is a matter of context. When the “words” referred to 
can be counted, and this numerical factor is of importance, Wörter (terms) is the right 
choice (e.g., “the essay must be 500 words [Wörter]). The philosophical point behind this 
practical distinction is that when words are seen only as terms (Wörter), they are merely 
as distinct numerical units, “atoms” of sense à la Bertrand Russell (e.g.). Still, as will be 
shown, the philosophical point Heidegger wishes to make goes much deeper.  
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show in a few sentences, even assertions that have since time immemorial appeared 
incontestable—e.g., “God is the Absolute”—are easily unsettled.12 Thus opposed to the 
doctrine of the logos, Heidegger affirms that when “we say” assertions “thoughtfully,” 
they “do not stay fixed” (156, italics added). For such fixity, on its part, depends on the 
singularity of words as Wörter, an understanding of language that levels it off into 
commonness and average intelligibility. When taken as pitchers and kegs, words do not 
come to language, but merely terms—merely the most surface level, wide-spread, easily 
accessible reality of language. Thus Heidegger writes: 
Words are not terms, and thus are not like buckets and kegs from which we scoop 
a content that is there. Words are wellsprings that are found and dug up in the 
telling, wellsprings that must be found and dug up again and again, that easily cave 
in, but that at times also well up when least expected (130, italics added). 
  
Hence “to pay heed to what the words say is different in essence from what it first 
seems to be, a mere preoccupation with terms.” Getting over this latter preoccupation, 
Heidegger adds, “is particularly difficult for us moderns, because we find it hard to 
detach ourselves from the ‘at first’ of what is common; and if we succeed for once, we 
relapse all too easily” (130). Such habitual detachment and reliance on what is common 
is given a radical remedy: instead of always only taking the word “at first” glance, we 
must “go to the spring again and again,” each time tracing the word to its initial source, 
and each time trying to, once again, keep it there (130). In this tracing, we “must go back 
into the history of the word,” and in doing so, dig up its original contents (131).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 “The statement ‘God is the Absolute’ may serve as an example. The ambiguity that is 
here possible is foreshadowed by the difference in stress with which a statement of this 
kind can be pronounced: God is the Absolute—or, God is the Absolute. The first sentence 
means: God alone can claim the distinction of being the Absolute. The second sentence 
means: only by virtue of the absoluteness of the Absolute is God essentially God. The 
statement ‘God is the Absolute’ is shown to have several meanings. In appearance, the 
sentence is a simple proposition, a logos in the sense defined” (WhD? 156).  
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In the lecture proceeding what has just been cited, Heidegger attempts to show us 
how this can be done with the word “thinking.” With this word, “something has entered 
language—not just of late, but long ago. But though it entered language, it did not get 
through. It has gone back into the unspoken, so that we cannot reach it without some 
further effort” (133). But what is it that this word brought to language originally? Our 
answer can only come from listening to how Heidegger tries to retrieve it from the 
“unspoken.” 
What is it that is named with the words ‘think,’ ‘thinking,’ ‘thought’? Toward what 
sphere of the spoken word do they direct us? A thought—where is it, where does it 
go? Thought is in need of memory, the gathering of thought. The Old English 
thencan, to think, and thancian, to thank, are closely related; the Old English noun 
for thought is thanc or thonc—a thought, a grateful thought, and the expression of 
such a thought; today it survives in the plural thanks. The ‘thanc,’ that which is 
thought, the thought, implies the thanks. 
 
Thus while “a thought usually means an idea, a view or opinion, a notion,” 
Heidegger is able to claim that “the root or originary word [thanc] says: the gathered, the 
all-gathering thinking that recalls” (139). But even further, this originary word “is imbued 
with the original nature of memory: the gathering of the constant intention of everything 
that the heart holds in present being” (141). And this, in turn, helps us to better 
understand the idea of thinking as thanking:  
In giving thanks, the heart gives thought to what it has and what it is. The heart, 
thus giving thought and thus being memory, gives itself in thought to that to which 
it is held. It thinks of itself as beholden, not in the sense of mere submission, but 
beholden because its devotion is held in listening (141).   
 
Original thinking, as an original thanking, is nothing other than “the thanks owed 
for Being.” In its essential breadth, thinking does not simply take place in mental 
assertions, but occurs thankfully, in thanking Being and the Es gibt for our mortal 
dwelling. In heeding its gift, thinking takes place as a listening, a listening propelled by 
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the heart’s “devotion” to give thought to what is, to let beings give themselves to us in 
thought rather than to represent them to ourselves in intuition. Through its gathering and 
recalling, the heart, in thinking, retains that which has been, investing the absent with 
presence, and in this way giving thanks to what was. Thinking opens itself up to the 
“intention” of “all that is in Being,” to the way in which what is present—and presence 
itself—demands to come to presence of its own accord. Thinking accepts their gift, and 
responds by letting beings be (141).   
Much more could be said concerning the way Heidegger attends to the original 
contents of thinking, just as much more could be said to “defend” his “interpretation.” 
That, however, is somewhat beside the point. As he tells us in regards to the question of 
“correctness,” “only this much is clear: what the words thanc, thought, memory, thanks 
designate is incomparably richer in essential content than the current signification that 
the words still have for us in common usage” (142, italics added). The decisive factor in 
returning to and restoring the original contents of words, then, is not some kind of 
objectively verifiable philological precision, but instead the richness in essential content 
that such considerations can bring to language, the way in which our “vision achieves an 
open vista into the essential” realm of the word “thinking” (ibid.). What is decisive is 
that, instead of treating “thinking” like a bucket out of which meaning must be scooped, 
Heidegger treats thinking as einen Brunnen (“a wellspring”): a word, a word whose depth 
and unfathomability (when Brunnen is translated as “well”) is matched only by its force 
and uncontainability (when translated as a spring or fountain).  
Further, in his work with the original contents of the word “thinking,” we witness a 
demonstration of how an encounter with a foreign language can serve to clarify our own. 
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For it is only through recourse to the Old English thanc that the German Denken was 
allowed to be heard in a new and rich way. By contrasting the English with the German, 
and by bringing this contrast into dialogue with a more original understanding of 
memory, Heidegger shows how the mediation between the plurality of languages helps us 
to find new ways of thinking worn-out words, new ways of letting them show themselves 
from a way they once were manifested. Thus in short, without the aid of translation, 
Heidegger would have been unable to set “thinking” on a more original, essentially rich 
footing.   
Unfortunately time does not afford us the opportunity to continue looking at how 
Heidegger brings “thinking” to language over the next hundred or so pages, turning his 
attention from the doctrine of the logos to an essential saying of Parmenides. Instead, 
from this discussion we now turn towards Anaximander, the Greeks, and the process of 
translation—the “other side” of Heidegger’s preoccupation with the original contents of 
language. 
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IV. Translation and the Greeks: an Analysis of “Anaximander’s Saying” 
 
As we have acknowledged, there are two ways in which we must approach the idea 
of “original contents” and translation. The first, which we have now given a brief sketch 
of, is the way in which Heidegger works with the original contents of the German 
language. The second, to which we now devote our attention, is Heidegger’s work with 
the original contents of the Greek language. Naturally, translation here becomes a matter 
of the utmost significance.  
But as has been said, translation is not only significant in regards to the kind of 
thinking it can (and must, if done adequately) engender, but also within the larger 
“project” of Heidegger’s thinking. In short, because overcoming metaphysics requires a 
return to the thinking of the early Greeks, and because such a return hangs on the 
possibility of translation, translation itself becomes “the key” in learning thinking and 
changing the course of modernity. But why, we should ask again yet perhaps more 
explicitly, is this return to Greek thinking so necessary, seemingly the only way beyond 
metaphysics?  
Our answer must lie somewhere within the Greek language and way of thinking 
themselves, within the way in which those Greek thinkers before the rise of Plato “came 
closer” to thinking Being in its essential meaning through their words. Yet 
acknowledging this crucial aspect of Heidegger’s story of the history of philosophy only 
leaves us with more questions. What is it about their thinking that gives evidence of their 
attentiveness to language? How did they listen to language, what enabled them to speak 
from language? And finally, what is it about their language that makes it closer to Being, 
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better able to reveal it? Is its merit simply an extension of its originality, a by-product of 
coming chronologically before the onset of metaphysical thinking, or does it come from 
something apart from this negative advantage? And if it is truly worthy of our 
consideration, yet at the same time totally foreign to our (metaphysically conditioned) 
way of thinking, how will we be able to translate it?  
What it is “exactly” that constitutes the superiority of this language is difficult if 
not impossible to say. What is certain, however, is that the historical position of the pre-
Socratics is essential to who they were, how they thought, and how they spoke. For given 
Heidegger’s account of historicality and tradition, the fact that the pre-Socratics existed 
before the tradition we ourselves are a part of is significant. As is said in Being and Time, 
all thought is historically situated, bound by the thrownness of Dasein: the fact that we 
are born into a pre-existing culture with its own set of values and traditions, the fact that 
our freedom is constituted in part by the check put upon us by all that we have taken up 
passively through our indoctrination into society. As Heidegger writes, echoing what we 
have heard from our work with Was heisst Denken?, tradition “takes what has come 
down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence.” Such a making-close does not serve to 
make the origins and basic meanings of our tradition clear; rather, “it blocks our access to 
those primordial ‘sources’ from which the categories and concepts handed down to us 
have been in part quite genuinely drawn” (BT 21). Through tradition, the original ways 
we answered the fundamental philosophical questions—the original ways we sought to 
make sense of and ground man’s position in the world—have been made a fixture of 
common-sense. What is closest in the sense of most our own, most essential, has fallen 
into another kind of proximity: that of self-evidence.  
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The historical privilege of the pre-Socratics, then, is the lack of such influence. 
Though this is described in negative terms, it is of vital importance. For they embody 
exactly the kind of thinking that Heidegger is so desperately searching for: a thinking 
outside of metaphysics. In the pre-Socratics, Heidegger believed he found a way of 
thinking outside of the logical-grammatical mode of metaphysics that has dominated 
thinking for millennia. What we find so common-sensical as to deem unworthy of 
thought (Being, e.g., the “most universal” and “emptiest” of concepts) served for them as 
the impetus to philosophize. What we take as indubitable had not yet been established; 
the limitations of tradition were entirely nonexistent. While the pre-Socratics surely were 
thrown into their own world, that world was fundamentally different from the one that we 
find ourselves in, the one Heidegger believes to be hurtling towards disaster.    
Another element of Dasein’s historicality further determines the necessity of a 
return to Greek philosophy. Insofar as even authentic Dasein cannot escape its situation 
in time, the thinking that is to be met with beyond metaphysics cannot be some free-
floating, a-historical ideal (met with through “the invention of new terms,” as Heidegger 
once thought), but must involve that resolute “repetition of a possibility of existence that 
has come down to us,” in which we are to “[go] back into the possibilities of the Dasein 
that has-been-there” (BT 387). Thinking is not the overcoming of the past, but its 
authentic repetition; it is neither the disavowal of our tradition nor a mere re-turning of 
the wheel, but a resolute transformation of what has come unto what will be. Such is why 
Heidegger’s own relationship towards the past—his planned Destruktion of the history of 
ontology—is not destructive in the ordinary sense. As he explains, it has “nothing to do 
with a vicious relativizing of ontological standpoints,” but rather intends to “stake out the 
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positive possibilities of that tradition,” and in doing so, “positively [make] the past our 
own” (21-22). As he writes in a never-given lecture on Nietzsche, the “other 
commencement”—i.e., of a new thinking/speaking—“does not leap outside” its 
“historical ground,” it “does not renounce what has been, but goes back into the grounds 
of the first commencement” (NIII 182). Overcoming metaphysics does not require us to 
reach higher and beyond what has come down to us, but rather to “climb back down” the 
history of metaphysics and come out “beneath” it (LH 254).   
Given Heidegger’s understanding of historicality, a return to the Greeks—i.e., a 
return to the original contents of our language (by means of translation)—comes to 
represent the only possibility of an “other commencement.” The translation of Greek 
words confronts us as the only authentic possibility we are left with, the only way for us 
to once again engage with the question of Being in a fruitful way. Such translation, 
however, must be of a particular kind. Its aim is not to be faithful in the sense of literal, 
the mere reiteration of an antiquated position in one’s mother tongue. Such translation, 
like Heidegger’s Destruktion, must seek to make the past “positively [it’s] own” (BT 
22)—to “[grasp] its tradition creatively” (IM 43). Such non-violent appropriation is the 
basic character of translation thought of in a Heideggerian sense (at least when it comes 
to translating ancient Greek), the way in which the constant decay of language might be 
reversed.  
It is in this sense that I believe we should hear Heidegger’s rather infamous 
assertion that “we must understand the Greeks better than they understood themselves” 
(BPP 111). For the goal of an engagement with Greek thought is not simply to be able to 
reiterate what they said, but to rekindle a kind of thinking that was snuffed out far too 
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prematurely, a kind of thinking that might provide a new path for “the West.” To provide 
such a path, it is not enough to know what the Greeks thought—the manner of thinking 
itself must be made our own, for only so can it offer a truly new commencement. As one 
of Heidegger’s examples goes, we must not only “experience alētheia in a Greek manner 
as unconcealment,” but “above and beyond the Greeks, think it as the clearing of self-
concealing” (EPTT 448)—we must, by thinking with the Greeks, think beyond them 
toward another commencement, our own commencement. If we only understood the 
Greeks as well as they understood themselves, who is to say metaphysics would not 
simply repeat itself?  
Before looking more closely at the ways in which such appropriative translations 
might be performed, we should note another context in which translation plays a vital 
role. For another reason we must return to the Greeks is that, as Heidegger writes in the 
1930’s, the true “rootlessness of Western thought” does not begin with them, but with 
their successors: the Romans (149). Here, translation is highlighted as the means by 
which Greek thought was usurped and obscured by Rome, insofar as the seemingly literal 
translations of Greek words served in fact to Latinize Greek thinking.  
Beneath the seemingly literal and thus faithful translation there is concealed, 
rather, a translation of Greek experience into a different way of thinking. Roman 
thought takes over the Greek words without a corresponding, equally original 
experience of what they say, without the Greek word (OWA 149). 
 
Far from being literal, the Latin translations stamped Greek concepts with a distinctly 
Roman seal. In the Latin words, the Greek world no longer speaks.  
           With the Roman mode of translation we encounter the opposite of Heidegger’s 
method. The difference is captured nicely in a passage from Nietzsche on the topic of 
Roman translation.   
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…Roman antiquity itself: how forcibly and at the same time how naively it took 
hold of everything good and lofty of Greek antiquity, which was more ancient! 
How they translated things into the Roman present! How deliberately and 
recklessly they brushed the dust off the wings of the butterfly that is called 
moment!.... Quickly, they replaced [the Greek] with what was contemporary and 
Roman. They seem to ask us: ‘Should we not make new for ourselves what is old 
and find ourselves in it? Should we not have the right to breathe our own soul into 
this dead body? For it is dead after all; how ugly is everything dead!’ They did not 
know the delights of the historical sense; what was past and alien was an 
embarrassment for them; and being Romans, they saw it as an incentive for a 
Roman conquest. Indeed, translation was a form of conquest…[done] with the 
very best conscience of the imperium Romanum (The Gay Science 137-8).  
 
           In considering the vast amount that is here shared by Nietzsche and Heidegger, we 
note that the only significant difference appears at the level of intention. For Nietzsche, 
the Romans explicitly translated as a form of conquest, consciously doing violence to the 
ancient Greek (“For it is dead after all; how ugly is everything dead!”) and using their 
words for their own purpose, “with the very best” Roman conscience. Heidegger’s 
account is more subtle: it is not a matter of one Roman’s purposeful conquest of one 
Greek poet (Nietzsche’s examples), but rather the unconscious imposition of a present 
communal spirit on an old one. Nonetheless, the basic outline is the same: for both, 
Roman thinking is seen as the Roman acquisition and usurpation of ancient Greece.  
           Heidegger’s method seeks the opposite effect: it hopes to preserve the historical 
spirit of the language and the world of the people who spoke it. Translation is neither a 
usurpation nor mere reiteration, but a creative appropriation that retains the world of the 
original while simultaneously going beyond it. To see how this is supposedly 
accomplished, we take our final step and enter into “Anaximander’s Saying.” 
The goal of this essay is to offer an alternative translation of “the oldest saying of 
Western thinking” (AS 242), supposedly uttered by Anaximander of Miletus (610-546 
BC) and preserved in a commentary on Aristotle’s Physics written by the neo-Platonist 
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Simplicius. By following it, we are offered a view of Heidegger’s method of translation 
in action, and through this model, a way of describing what might be called his “theory” 
of translation. Even further, through an explanation of his method and his theory, all of 
the various strands of thinking that we have become familiar with thus far—the threat of 
the assertion, the criticism of language as communication, the ideas that language speaks, 
that we speak only from listening to language, that language founds our historical 
existence, etc.—will come together in the essential role translation plays in Heidegger’s 
thoughts on language and his philosophy as a whole.  
In the essay, amidst discussions varying from the fate of the West to the “epoche 
of Being” and the history of Greek thought, Heidegger proceeds to meticulously 
formulate a new translation of the two sentences that make up Anaximander’s saying 
(254). While the process often relies on philological and etymological deconstruction, 
Heidegger insists that his translations are “not based on etymological or lexical 
consideration” (278). Instead, reiterating the idea that “every translation must necessarily 
accomplish the transition from the spirit of one language into that of another” (HHdI 62), 
Heidegger explains that to translate Anaximander’s saying “requires that we bring hither 
[herübersetzen] into our German language what is said in the Greek. To this end it is 
necessary that, before the translating, our thinking is translated [übersetzt] into what is 
said in the Greek” (248). For Heidegger, “only through a dialogue between thought and 
what this thoughtful saying says can it be translated,” regardless of how “violent” 
(“incorrect,” “unfaithful”) its results may seem in the eyes of those seeking or expecting a 
merely “literal” translation (247-8). Before any adequate translation of the saying can 
occur, we must make a thoughtful leap into the unfamiliar realm of the Greeks, the realm 
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whose spirit supposedly speaks in the saying. Still, as Heidegger’s word-play implies, 
this prior step is already itself a process of translation—the translation of thought 
necessary in advance of the translation of words.  
But how, we should ask, can we access the thoughts contained in the saying if we 
do not have access to the saying in a language we understand? Heidegger’s answer 
consists in the idea that the translation of thought can and must be accomplished by 
looking outside of Anaximander: “what is necessary before interpreting” (and thus 
translating) “the saying is to trans-late ourselves—at first without the help of the 
saying—to the place from which what is said in the saying comes” (255). The translation 
of Anaximander’s words must be guided and “governed by the knowledge of what in 
early times was thought and thinkable in such terms—as distinct from the prevailing 
representations of later times” (256). We must “consciously set aside” such 
“inappropriate preconceptions,” all of the traditional ways in which the words of 
philosophy have been understood and determined by metaphysics: for this way of 
thinking is completely foreign to the Greek experience that preceded it (250). What is 
essential is that we train our ears to hear Greek words in a Greek manner—that we learn 
to think in a Greek way.  
The skeptic, however, is prepared with a rather simple retort: for even if one 
begins without the help of the saying, one must nevertheless begin with some Greek word 
through which to become acquainted with their way of thinking, and thus one who is not 
completely fluent in Greek must begin with translation. Following this line of thinking, 
translation becomes impossible, for the possibility of learning to think in a Greek way 
comes to hang on the existence of the translations it itself was to be the basis of.  
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Heidegger gives us little in the way of a response, which is no surprise given the 
fact that he never recognizes this skepticism as a potential problem. Instead, he simply 
proceeds to show us what he means by learning to think in a Greek way, apparently 
forgetting that his fluency in Greek and thorough knowledge of its etymology are what 
allows him to proceed in the first place. Perhaps, however, there is a rather simple way to 
overcome this apparent paradox. Perhaps Heidegger acknowledges that we must begin 
with translation, despite how “untrue” our first attempt assuredly is. Maybe it is only 
through such “tarrying with the negative” that we may come to think in a Greek way, the 
way necessary before our translation can move from merely correct to true. Whether or 
not the reader is convinced, we will take it to be the case, especially given the fact that 
Heidegger spends such a great amount of time with wrong translations before even 
beginning to formulate his own. Said differently, it is not a contradiction to assert the 
necessity of a prior translation of thought and to begin with “correct but untrue” 
translations, for only “true” or “authentic” translations depend on such a translation of 
thought.  
Through these remarks we are afforded a view of the process of translation in 
Heidegger’s sense. This process, mirrored in the structure of the essay, begins with a 
diligent analysis of conventional translations, an analysis that turns into a critique as soon 
as the restoration of the “original sense” of the words contained in the quotation begins. 
Although this simultaneous critique/restoration occurs partially by means of philological 
considerations, Heidegger insists that it is only by consulting the “thinkers” that spoke 
this ancient language that we can get a sense of their words that is “governed by the 
knowledge of what in early times was thought and thinkable in such terms” (256). It is 
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this mixture of philology and the analysis of these terms as they come up in other thinkers 
that serves to bring about the transformation in thinking needed in order to furnish an 
adequate translation, i.e., one that conveys the foreign way of thinking that speaks in the 
saying in one’s native tongue. Stated as concisely as possible, Heidegger’s process of 
translation moves from conventional (untrue) translations back to the Greek terms, 
redefining them in light of philological considerations, on the hand, and by contrasting 
them with their sense one gets of them in their appearance in passages from other 
thinkers, on the other—in this way, finally arriving at a translation that actually “[brings 
hither] into our German language what is said in the Greek” (248).  
But to get a better sense of the general method of translation, we must look at 
how it is enacted in the particular instance of “Anaximander’s Saying.” As we have 
mentioned, the process of translation at the heart of this essay is interspersed with 
discussions about the fate of philosophy, ideas like “the eschatology of Being” (246) and 
“the epoche of Being” (254), and much, much more. To abate the possibility of becoming 
lost in the various trains of thought simultaneously at work in this essay, we will outline 
it only insofar as it allows us to understand the three most crucial terms in Heidegger’s 
retranslation: ta onta (the beings/things/entities), adikia (injustice), chreon (necessity).13 
The first term stands as the “subject matter” of the saying (249), the second represents 
“Anaximander’s experience [of] the totality of the things that present” (his description of 
the subject matter of the saying, 266), and the third stands as “the oldest name in which 
thinking brings the Being of beings to language” (274) . The reason these three terms are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 In what follows, transliterations of key Greek terms will be used instead of the original 
Greek script (the way it is found in the English translation of “Anaximander’s Saying” 
here cited).   
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of the utmost importance is clear: they encompass an early Greek experience of Being. 
But, we must ask, what is this experience? How is Being thought in these words? What 
do they say—that is, what did they say for the Greeks?  
Heidegger begins his essay with two translations, one from Nietzsche and one 
from Hermann Diels. The latter, he notes, “is in many respects the more literal”—“but if 
a translation is merely literal it cannot be assumed to be faithful. It only becomes faithful 
when its words are words that speak out of the language of the matter” (243). After this 
broad statement Heidegger adds that while both of these translations “arise from different 
impulses and intentions,” they are united in being guided by a specific conception of 
Anaximander. In other words, the translations that they reach are “wrong” for Heidegger 
because they are not oriented towards the matter of thought; instead, they get their 
bearing from what he calls the “implicit standard for explicating and judging the early 
thinkers”: Plato and Aristotle (243). These conventional translations are tainted by a 
particular way of understanding ancient Greek thought, a Platonic/Aristotelian lens, 
naturally conditioned by the fact that the quotation itself is presented and described by a 
neo-Platonist. By going against the necessity of “consciously [setting] aside … 
inappropriate preconceptions,” these translations set early thinking in the relief of 
metaphysics, a way of thinking Heidegger believes to be totally foreign to Anaximander 
(250).  
After announcing the need to move beyond all Aristotelain, Platonic, and Socratic 
lenses, Heidegger unleashes a series of questions regarding the possibility of being 
addressed by what is truly said in Anaximander’s saying, a saying separated from us by 
two and a half millennia. In response to those who doubt such a possibility, Heidegger 
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writes, “if we can manage, just once, to hear the saying it will speak to us no longer as a 
historically remote opinion” (247). The question of hearing brings Heidegger to the way 
of translation we have already described, finally resulting in the arduous and lengthy 
process of retranslation. 
This process begins, according to our outline, with the presentation of the 
quotation “more literally translated”—that is, it begins with a “correct” translation. 
But that from which things have their arising also gives rise to their passing away 
according to necessity; they give justice and penalty to each other for the injustice 
according to the ordinance of time (248). 
 
What follows is a description of the “usual view” of Anaximander’s saying, that 
which is conditioned by Aristotle’s interpretation (248). This view holds that  
the sentence speaks about the arising and decay of things. It specifies the nature of 
this process. Arising and decay return to the place from where they came. Things 
develop and then decay, exhibiting a kind of barter system in nature’s unchanging 
economy (248).  
 
The usual view takes Anaximander’s words as a “beginner’s attempt at scientific 
research,” a vague description of a natural process (248). From this perspective, the 
“subject matter of the saying” is natural beings, things of nature, material bodies—things 
that, due to the primitive status of science during the time of Anaximander, are described 
inappropriately “in terms of those [things] familiar from the human sphere”; in other 
words, “moral and legal concepts infiltrate the picture of nature” (249). In sum, the 
common understanding of this saying takes it to be a crude statement about nature that 
uses moral and legal concepts as crutches.  
 As is no surprise, Heidegger wishes to advance a different understanding. In 
this context, his first translation-related correction consists in pointing out that the subject 
matter (ta onta, the beings) is not simply natural beings, but “the manifold being,” “the 
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multiplicity of beings as a whole”—all that about which we can say “it is” (249). As we 
have outlined Heidegger’s method of translation, the substantiation of this translation 
must come both from philological considerations and through comparing it with other 
passages in which the term plays a significant role. In this particular instance, 
Heidegger’s philological considerations come by means of “some preliminary remarks 
concerning the history of language” (i.e., concerning the etymology of ta onta, 259) and 
his point of comparison consists of a passage from Homer’s Iliad in which ta onta 
“comes to the fore in a more than merely lexical way. It is a passage, rather, in which 
what ta onta names is brought to language poetically” (259).  
 Beginning with the philological/grammatical side, let us quote Heidegger at 
length.  
In Plato and Aristotle, on and onta confront us as conceptual words. The later 
terms ‘ontic’ and ‘ontological’ are formed from them. Linguistically, however, 
on and onta are presumably forms of the original words eon and eonta which 
have somehow become abbreviated. Only in the original words is the sound still 
preserved with which we say eon and eonta…. In contrast, on and onta look like 
rootless participial endings, as though, by themselves, they specifically 
designate what we must think in those word forms called by grammarians 
metoke, participium; in other words, those word forms which participate in the 
verbal and nominal sense of a word. Thus on says ‘being’ in the sense of to be a 
being; but on also names a being  which is. In the duality of the participial 
signification of on there lies concealed the distinction between ‘being [seiend]’ 
and ‘a being [Seiendem].’ Thus represented, what is here set forth looks at first 
sight like a grammatical splitting of hairs. In truth, however, it is the enigma of 
Being (259-60).  
 
 Amongst the many noteworthy claims contained in these passages, perhaps the 
most radical (other than the last sentence, of course) is that the distinction Heidegger is 
thought to have introduced to the world in 1927 was in fact already present in the ancient 
Greek terminology. This difference between beings and Being is one we have already 
acknowledged to be central to Heidegger’s understanding of ontology, representing what 
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Heidegger comes to call the ontological difference. The use of ta onta thus must be 
distinguished from the later conceptual terms from which we derive the terms ontic and 
ontology, those that make up the Aristotelian/Platonic lens Heidegger wishes to discard. 
Hence the subject matter of the saying is not a conceptual term, not a metaphysical 
categorization, but something else entirely: “the manifold being” (249). For Heidegger, 
when Anaximander says ta onta, his meaning must be understood as if he had used ta 
eonta—the “archaic Greek” word common to Parmenides and Heraclitus—rather than the 
participial residue of the Platonic/Aristotelian notions of Being (259). For even within the 
grammatical construction of ta onta the overriding tendency of metaphysics is already at 
work, already fashioning the logical-grammatical conception of language, already 
defining the word according to its “verbal and nominal sense.”  
 George McCarthy helps us to articulate this crucial point regarding the 
evolution of Being from pre- to post-Platonic thought, a point we have already become 
familiar with.  
 In post-Platonic thought, scholasticism, and metaphysics, eon is transformed 
into a distinct entity with fundamental and essential characteristics defining its 
being as an entity. Heidegger, reacting to this anthropomorphism, defines Being 
not as an entity, but as a process in which entities come to light and are made 
visible. Being and becoming are part of this process of presencing (einai).  
 …As the philosophical fragment of Anaximander speaks to Heidegger, he 
considers the nature of Being in terms of coming (genesis) and passing away 
(pthora). Avoiding the pitfalls of juxtaposing an opposition between Being and 
becoming, Heidegger wishes to show the intimate connection between two 
distinct temporal elements of Being itself. The distinction between something as 
it comes to be and something that passes away is a process in which [a being]14 
comes into ‘unconcealment’ (101). 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 McCarthy, instead of writing “a being,” writes “an object”—a formulation must avoid 
for obvious reasons (principally, the anti-subjectivist thrust of Heidegger’s understanding 
of language (101).  
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 Here we see more clearly that fundamental point of Heidegger’s “preliminary 
remarks concerning the history of language” is to reiterate what we referred to in our first 
chapter as the three ontological tiers (259). This in turn gives us a better sense of why 
Heidegger sees within the early Greek thinkers “the secrets to the notion of Being,” a 
more “primordial” ontological “vision” (McCarthy 100). In Anaximander’s fragment, 
Heidegger hears a way of thinking Being that aligns itself with his own attempted move 
beyond the ontology of metaphysics—the two are united in their status as 
unmentaphysical (one coming before, and one going beyond). However, we should not 
say that Heidegger finds in the Greeks a vision close to his own, but rather that this vision 
itself comes from the Greeks and his attempted return to their thinking. The early Greeks 
give Heidegger an initial push: they provide a flash of insight—a “lightening-glance,” 
both in the sense of illuminating and in the sense of a lightening bolt’s instantaneousness 
(AS 255)—into the way in which thinking might exist unmetaphysically.  
 In the specific instance of Anaximander’s saying, our lightening-glance is 
granted by the description of the totality of beings as defined by coming to be and passing 
away. As we have said, Heidegger does not interpret this description as pertaining 
exclusively to natural beings and their physical presence and decay, but rather as the way 
in which beings can be defined in terms of unconcealment. Coming to be and passing 
away are not simply poetic ways of describing birth and death, but more importantly, 
ways in which beings can be defined in terms of the clearing (“coming to be” means 
coming to show itself in unconcealment; “passing away” means to return back to the 
hiddenness of concealment). In this sense, the saying goes about clarifying beings in the 
opposite direction of metaphysics: beings are defined from “out of” the clearing, from out 
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of Being itself. These words, so important for Heidegger, are here not neglected in favor 
of a greater attention to beings, but instead serve as a ground and foundation upon which 
the nature of beings can be explained. In the saying, Being—at least to some extent—
finally comes to ground beings.   
 Hence the acknowledged grandiosity of the conclusion of these “brief” remarks: 
  
We might say—in an exaggerated way which nevertheless touches upon the 
truth—that the destiny of the West rests on the translation of the word eon, 
given that the translation [Übersetzung] is a crossing over [Übersetzung] to the 
truth of what comes to language in the eon (260).  
 
 The world-historical significance of this word and how it has been translated 
(that is, following from the lecture on Hölderlin, how it has been interpreted) is clear 
enough from the veritable Heideggerian obsession with the question of Being and his 
unequivocal belief in its importance. But in the context of “Anaximander’s Saying,” it is 
important to note that such significance is grounded particularly in what Heidegger calls 
the “epoche of Being” (254). As simply as possible, this term denotes a particular way in 
which history is understood “[from] out of the oblivion of Being”—that is, from out of 
the fact that Being has remained unthought (insofar as “by revealing itself in the being, 
Being withdraws,” 254). From this perspective, historical periods are to be determined on 
the basis of how Being remained concealed, and in turn by how such concealment 
furnished a particular historical people with a definite way of understanding Being. The 
essential movement of history, given this perspective, thus consists of “errancy,” a 
perpetual distancing from Being reflected by a perpetual zooming in on beings (254). 
 In such errancy, Being “keeps to itself. This keeping to itself is the way it 
discloses itself early on. Its early sign is the a-lētheia” (254). Unconcealment is thus the 
first and last hint the West has received about Being. Through this hint, Being is 
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illuminated—but illuminated as a “keeping to itself with the truth of its essence” (254). 
The epoche of Being, then, is the history of the oblivion of this hint, the history of how 
this formulation went from a profound realization concerning the essence of what is to 
the mundane and lazy assertion that Being is “the emptiest and most universal concept” 
(264). Only this is “authentic world history”: what we might describe as the “base” on 
which the “superstructure” of “real history” occurs, the base which itself determines the 
way in which real historical events have played out (254). Therefore, by claiming that the 
destiny of the West depends on how eon has been interpreted and translated, Heidegger is 
claiming that Western history as we normally think of it is only a phantom or residue of 
the ever-exacerbated forgetfulness and oblivion of Being (thought in terms of the three 
ontological tiers of beings, Being, and the clearing/the es gibt).  
 In concluding our analysis of these remarks concerning the history of language, 
we must ask what McCarthy means when he says that “Heidegger wishes to show the 
intimate connection between two distinct temporal elements of Being itself” (101). To do 
this, we turn from these historical remarks to the second way in which Heidegger goes 
about determining the original Greek sense of ta onto: an appeal to Homer’s Iliad.  
 The specific passage under consideration consists of lines 68-72 of the first 
book of the Iliad, where the Achaeans, outside the walls of Troy, have been suffering 
through nine days of plague sent by Apollo. “At the assembly of warriors,” Heidegger 
explains, “Achilles commands Kalchas, the seer, to interpret the wrath of the god:” 
 Calchas, Thestor’s son, the wisest bird-interpreter 
 Who knew what is, what will be or what once was, 
 Who guided here before Troy the ships of the Achaeans,  
 Through the prophetic spirit granted him by Phoebus Apollo (260).  
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 In his description of the seer, Homer characterizes Calchas as the one “who 
knew what is, what will be or what once was.” That is, eonta does not only embrace what 
is present in the sense of temporally present (“here and now”), but also “what is past and 
what is in the future. Both constitute a way of being present being, namely, being an 
unpresently present being” (261). Beings that are no longer or not yet here are 
nonetheless said to be present—they still are, despite their (temporally present) absence. 
Ta eonta, then, “remains ambiguous”: it “means on the one hand the presently present, 
and on the other, however, both the presently present and unpresently present” (261).  
 Furthermore, “the ‘gegen [against]’ in ‘gegenwärtig [present]’ does not mean 
standing over against a subject, but rather the open region [Gegend] of unconcealment 
into and within which that which has arrived lingers” (261). The presencing of beings, 
though of in an early Greek manner, does not occur “over against a subject,” but rather 
amidst the clearing of alētheia. Beings come and go, lingering for a while in 
unconcealment only to slide back into the darkness of what is hidden. They are not 
brought forth through the representation of an ego, but rather manifest themselves in their 
own way of arising and passing away. Amidst the clearing, man does not occupy a 
privileged position, but rather dwells “alongside” those beings that show themselves and 
remain veiled (261). With early Greek thinking, man is seen in the “ecological” sense we 
mentioned in regards to Charles Taylor.  
 This completely un-subjectivist way of thinking (that, as we know, Heidegger is 
working towards) is captured in the description of the seer. Calchas stands “in the sight of 
what is present in unconcealment, which at the same time has illuminated the 
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concealment of the absent as the absent” (262). Through his vision the seer is “beside, 
outside, himself,” he “is away” (ek-static):  
 We ask: away to where? And from where? Away from the mere crush of what 
lies before us, of the merely presently present, and away to the absent…The seer 
is outside himself in the single breadth of the presence of that which is in every 
way present…For the seer, everything present and absent is gathered and 
preserved in one presencing (262).  
 
 Such preservation [wahren], Heidegger continues, must be thought of “as an 
illuminating-gathering sheltering” (262). The one whose duty it is to preserve presence in 
its temporal triad, whose essence consists in the “protection of Being,” is none other than 
“the shepherd of Being” (262). Thus Homer’s seer is, in fact, a description of authentic 
Dasein. For the seer, “the intimate connection between two distinct temporal elements of 
Being itself” is clear: all beings are bound together by presence, a process of coming to 
be and passing away that embraces the absent within itself (McCarthy 101). The 
metaphysical domain, in which beings are thought only in the sense of the constancy of 
their present presence—that is, thought in a static enough way as to be best suited for the 
ambitions of the lord of beings—is overcome through a vision of the temporal unity of 
Being. This vision allows the seer to overcome the obstinacy of Dasein’s everydayness, a 
way of Being blind to anything other than “the mere crush of what lies before us,” 
opening the seer’s eyes to the clearing of unconcealment, rekindling a way to reawaken 
the question of the meaning of Being.  
 The result of Heidegger’s analysis of Homer’s seer is a way of thinking ta eonta 
in an authentically Greek manner, as “presencing in unconcealment” (261). In this 
understanding, the temporal dimension of Being is subsumed in the process of presencing 
itself, determined as a movement leading to, arriving in, and following from 
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unconcealment. Thus the seer’s vision lends us to a way of thinking beings on the basis 
of Being, a way of understanding beings on the basis of the movement of presencing 
itself. Being is not forgotten or neglected, but thought as the movement (the becoming) of 
unconcealment. Only on this basis are beings then understood—in other words, beings 
are explained according the essence of Being itself. Hence Heidegger can answer the 
question “whither have Homer’s words trans-lated [über-gesetzt] us?” by stating simply 
“to the eonta.”  
 The Greeks experience the being as that which is present (whether presently so 
or not), present in unconcealment. Our use of ‘being’ to translate on is no longer 
obtuse; ‘to be’ as the translation of einai and the Greek word itself are no longer 
hastily employed code words for arbitrary and vague representations of 
indeterminate generality…ta eonta, the presently and unpresently present, is the 
inconspicuous name of that which comes expressly to language in 
Anaximander’s saying. The word names that which, as the still unspoken—
unspoken in thinking—addresses all thought. The word names that which, 
whether spoken or not, henceforth lays claim to all Western thinking (263-4).  
 
 Before looking more closely at what this particular act of translation has to 
contribute to our general discussion of translation and language, let us look at what I find 
to be the other two most important examples of translation in “Anaximander’s Saying”: 
the translation of adikia (injustice) as “Dis-order” [Un-Fug] (269) and of chreon as 
“usage [Brauch]” (276).  
 Turning his attention from ta onta to adikia, Heidegger claims that this word, 
“literally translated” as “injustice,” represents the way in which Anaximander 
“[experiences] the totality of things that presence” (266). Leaving this statement 
unsubstantiated (perhaps because such substantiation can only come out of a thoughtful 
encounter with early Greek thinking, that is, the completion of the present process), 
Heidegger asks: “How is it that what presences, staying, stands in injustice? What is 
	   93	  
unjust about the thing that presences? Does it not have the right to stay awhile, from time 
to time, and so fulfill its presencing?” (267).  
 Noting the need to “steer clear of our judicial-moral representations” (and thus 
also noting, by extension, that translations such as penalty or injustice are inappropriate), 
Heidegger begins the process with the most basic way we can understand the word in a 
Greek sense, building on this way of thinking until he reaches a more “thoughtful” 
translation. If “we stick to what comes to language, then adikia says that where it 
prevails, all is not right with things. That means, something is out of joint.” To be out of 
joint, he continues, entails a fundamental “jointure” that “belongs to presencing as such.” 
This jointure, he claims, is the “while” in which things stay for a time between coming to 
be and passing away, the “between” in which the presently present makes its stand in 
unconcealment between its coming into unconcealment and returning to concealment. 
“Presencing occurs in this jointure,” in this movement of arising and passing away, as 
this temporary stand “enjoined toward absence…in both directions” (267).  
 But if presence occurs in the jointure, why is it that beings are defined in their 
essence as “out of joint”? Put simply, because beings can refuse the movement of 
presencing.  
 What has arrived [in unconcealment] may even insist on its while, solely to 
remain more present, in the sense of enduring. That which stays persists in its 
presencing. In this way it takes itself out of its transitory while. It extends itself 
in a stubborn pose of persistence. It concerns itself no longer with the other 
things that are present. As though this were the way to stay, it becomes 
concerned with the permanence of its continued existence…. The dis-jointure 
consists in the fact that what stays awhile tries to have its while understood only 
as continuation. Thought from out of the jointure of the while, staying as 
persistence is insurrection on behalf of sheer endurance…. In this rebellious 
whiling, that which stays awhile insists on sheer continuation. It presences, 
therefore, without and against the jointure of the while (267-8). 
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 The dis-jointure of beings stems from an impulse within these beings 
themselves to be understood in terms of sheer continuance, persistent presence in the 
sense of that which always lies before us, constantly “here now.” Said differently, there 
exists a drive common to all beings to continue in the kind of presence best suited for 
metaphysical inquiry (although not in the sense of having the intent to be best suited for 
metaphysics)—a drive to exist as objects. This drive, possible for every being, goes 
against the very movement of presencing: its stubbornness and obstinacy come as an 
“insurrection” against the natural temporal course of Being itself. Through this insistence, 
through going against the jointure in which presencing occurs, beings are in “dis-
jointure.” 
 The picture is not so simple, however. For Anaximander “does not say that 
everything that presences loses itself in dis-jointure,” but rather quite the opposite: that 
they “[give] jointure” (268). Given the translation of adikia as dis-order, the translation of 
dike as order instead of the alternatives—penalty, punishment, fine, justice—is clear. 
Further, because we are not speaking of something that it paid (a penalty or a fine), the 
translation of didonai as give is far more accurate. But how can beings both be thought 
on the basis of disjointure and be thought to give jointure? Heidegger’s answer comes 
from thinking the word “to give” in a more “primordial” manner (269).  
 Giving is not only giving away. More primordial, is giving in the sense of 
conceding. Giving of this kind lets belong to another what properly belongs to 
him. What belongs to what presences is the jointure of the while which it 
enjoins in its arrival and departure. In the jointure, that which stays awhile keeps 
to its while. It does not strain to get away into the dis-jointure of sheer 
persistence. The jointure belongs to what stays awhile which, in turn, belongs in 
the jointure. The jointure [Fuge] is order [Fug] (269).  
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 In this passage, we see that the drive towards dis-jointure is (or at least can be) 
checked by another essential trait of the presencing of beings: a giving that, as a 
conceding, “lets order”—Heidegger’s reinterpretation of his retranslation—“belong” 
(269). Rather than insisting on sheer continuance, another possibility of presencing is 
open to beings: “lingering.” Presencing in this way, beings “[do] not fall victim to dis-
jointure,” but allow presence to occur according to its essence as enjoined to a two-fold 
absence. Through such lingering, a being “overcomes dis-order,” letting order belong, 
that is, letting order occur according to its essence. Beings linger by allowing presence its 
own way of presencing, instead of insisting on their own permanence; that is, instead of 
insisting on dis-order. 
 In addition to letting order belong, beings that linger also overcome dis-order by 
allowing “Ruch [reck]” to belong (271). The Greek word tisis here translated cannot, 
according to Heidegger, be thought of as “penalty,” for this translation “does not name 
the essential and original meaning of the word” (270). Instead, Heidegger asserts 
unflinchingly, “tisis is ‘esteem’” (270). This way of “paying heed,” he adds, is “better 
[captured]” in the word “consideration” (271). Such esteem or consideration becomes 
necessary because dis-order is not solely overcome through giving order (that is, a 
reorientation towards presence), but further requires a mutual letting-be of beings (that is, 
a reorientation towards that which presences). As we know, beings come to stand in dis-
jointure by insisting on their continued presence: “as they while they tarry. They hang 
on…they cling to themselves” (270). In this way, concerned only “with permanent 
continuance,” “no longer [looking] to the order of the while,”  
 …Everything that tarries pushes itself forward in opposition to everything else. 
None heeds the lingering essence of the others. The things that stay awhile are 
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without consideration toward each other: each is dominated by the craving for 
persistence in the lingering presence itself (271). 
 
 Here, the “rebellious whiling” is rethought from the way in which it relates to 
presencing in general to the way in which it relates one being’s presencing to another’s. 
Instead of an insurrection against presencing, here we find an insurrection against others, 
an inconsiderate selfishness, a Hobbesian world of all-against-all. The overcoming of dis-
order requires both a letting-be of order and a letting-be of one another. Beings not only 
must let order be as it is, but let others be what they are—a possibility blocked by the 
obstinacy of self-assertion. The word Heidegger chooses to encapsulate this way of 
orienting oneself towards others, coming from the “Middle High German ‘ruoche’” 
(“‘solicitude,’ ‘care’”), is “Ruch,” translated into English as “reck” (271)—another 
example of how Heidegger relies on thinking through the original contents of language. 
 From the idea of injustice and paying penalty we have moved through the idea 
of the jointure and arrived at a translation Heidegger believes to be in line with early 
Greek thinking. Now, instead of translating the current portion of Anaximander’s saying 
as “they pay each other punishment and penalty for their dastardliness,” or as “they must 
pay a penalty for their injustice” (242), we write: “they let order and reck belong to one 
another (in the surmounting of) dis-order” (280). It is clear, then, why Heidegger told us 
at the beginning that his translation would seem violent. Neither does it coincide with the 
other more literal translations nor does it come anywhere close to what a dictionary or 
common translator would provide. Nonetheless, Heidegger claims that his is the only 
translation that is truly faithful.  
 The final words at stake in Heidegger’s translation are, interestingly enough, the 
first words Heidegger believes to be attributable to Anaximander himself: kata to chreon, 
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“according to necessity” (273). “The grammatical form of [this] enigmatically ambiguous 
genitive,” Heidegger claims, “names a genesis, an origin of what is present from out of 
presencing” (274). “Hidden” within this origin is what remains to be thought in 
overcoming metaphysics, “the relation between presence and what presences”: the 
ontological difference (274). But before going on to offer a new translation of this word, 
Heidegger dives back into the epoche of Being.  
 From earliest times it has seemed as though presence and what is present are 
each something for themselves. Unintentionally, presence itself became 
something present. Represented in terms of something present it became that 
which is above everything else that is present and so the highest of beings that 
are present. As soon as presence is named, it is already represented as a present 
being…. The essence of presence together with the difference between presence 
and what is present remains forgotten. The oblivion of Being is oblivion to the 
difference between Being and the being.  
 
But oblivion to the difference is by no means the result of a forgetfulness of 
thinking. Oblivion of Being belongs to that essence of Being which it itself 
conceals…. Oblivion to the difference with which the destiny of Being begins—
so as to complete itself in such destiny—is not a deficiency. Rather, it is the 
richest and broadest event in which the world-history of the West achieves its 
resolution. It is the event of metaphysics (274-5).  
 
 Despite all of this, within Anaximander’s saying, in the words kata to chreon, 
there lies a hint to the nature of this difference, the relation between Being and beings; in 
fact, “the early word of Being, to chreon, names such a relation” (275). To get at what 
this word says (now a matter of utmost importance in multiple senses), despite 
Heidegger’s insistence on the fact that we cannot simply “[persist] with etymological 
dissection of the word,” he opts to begin with etymology—though an etymology with a 
clear Heideggerian stamp (276). 
 Heidegger says that the fact that chreon is “generally translated as necessity” is 
a “mistake.” Because chreon is derived from a set of words that “suggest” the Greek 
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word for hand, Heidegger argues that if we attend to these more archaic roots, we get a 
sense of chreon as “to place in someone’s hands, to hand over and deliver, to let 
something belong to someone” (276). From this, coupled with the fact that, given the 
context of Anaximander’s saying, chreon “can only name what is essential in the 
presencing of what is present,” Heidegger reasons that chreon “contains nothing of 
compulsion or ‘must’” implied by the translation of necessity. Instead, chreon is “the 
handing over of presencing” itself—“a handing over which hands out presencing to what 
is present, and therefore keeps it in hand, in other words, preserves in presencing, what is 
present as such” (276). 
 To capture this understanding, reminiscent of our discussion of das Ereignis 
and the “Es gibt,” Heidegger offers a translation that, while it “makes strenuous 
demands,” attributes “to the Greek word a meaning that is neither foreign to the word 
itself nor contrary to the matter discussed in the saying”: “usage [Brauch]” (276). In this 
final example of translation in the Heideggerian sense, the two aspects of his “method” 
align succinctly, and even further, provide us with an example of how Heidegger thinks 
through words according to their original contents.  
To what extent is chreon usage? The strangeness of the translation is 
ameliorated by thinking our word more clearly. Generally, we understand ‘to 
use’ to mean to utilize and need within the area of that to the use of which we 
enjoy a right. As the translation of chreon, ‘usage’ is not to be understood in 
these customary but secondary meanings. Rather, we attend to the root meaning: 
to use is bruchen [to brook?], in Latin frui, in German fruchten, Frucht [to bear 
fruit, fruit]. We translate this freely as ‘to enjoy [geniessen]’ which, in its 
original form [niessen], means to take joy in something and so to have it in use. 
Only in its secondary meaning does ‘to enjoy’ come to mean to consume and 
gobble up. We encounter what we have called the root meaning of ‘to use’ as 
frui when Augustine says ‘Quid enim est aliud quod dicimus frui, nisi praesto 
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habere, quod diligis?’15…. Frui contains: praesto, habere. Praesto, praesitum 
means in Greek…that which already lies before us in unconcealment, the onta, 
that which presences awhile. Accordingly, ‘to use’ says: to let something that is 
present come to presence as such. Frui, bruchen, to use, usage, means: to hand 
something over to its own essence and, as so present, to keep it in the protecting 
hand (277).  
 
 At play in Heidegger’s translation of chreon as “usage” [Brauch], then, are first, 
etymological considerations; second, a comparison with a thoughtful quotation in which 
it speaks “originally”; and finally, a thorough consideration of the “original contents” of 
language, “root meanings” of words as opposed to “secondary” or “derivative” ones. As 
Heidegger explains, we customarily understand usage and the verb “to use” in the sense 
of enjoyment, and enjoyment in the sense of the pleasure brought about in consuming and 
“gobbling up” (using). This, however, is only the familiar, “worn-out” meanings we 
attach to these words. If we attend to their root/original meanings, the words open 
themselves up in an entirely different way.  
 Heidegger shows this on multiple levels. First, he compares the German 
brauchen (to use, to need; compare with “usage,” Brauch) to the verb bruchen, a word 
that, as is shown by the question mark (“to brook?”), is of questionable philological 
tenacity. Setting this to the side, we note that Heidegger then compares bruchen to the 
Latin frui, and then to the German fruchten (to bear fruit). This Latin word is then 
“freely” translated back into German with geniessen (to enjoy), its common and 
“secondary” meaning then displaced through a reference to Augustine’s rhetorical 
question. In the end, this allows Heidegger to think Brauch “more clearly” as a kind of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 “For what else do we mean when we say frui if not to have at hand something 
especially prized?”  
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handing “something over to its own essence, and, as so present, to keep it in the 
protecting hand” (as something “prized”).  
 Now, one way we could approach this “clarification” would be by looking more 
closely at the etymological steps Heidegger takes. Still, even if I were fluent in Latin, 
such an approach would be misguided. For as we already know, “this translation cannot 
be scientifically established: nor should we have faith in it on the basis of some kind of 
authority.” Anaximander’s words, in Heidegger’s mind, “will never speak to us so long 
as we explain [them] in a merely historical and philological manner” (AS 280). As 
opposed to this, Heidegger embraces translation (and etymology, for that matter) 
“freely,” in terms of its creative and appropriative potential. The only way that this 
translation can become “authoritative” is through “thinking through the saying” and 
nothing more (ibid.).  
 As we said during our discussion of Was heisst Denken?, what is central to 
Heidegger’s work with the original contents of language is not the question of 
“correctness,” but the fact that through such thinking, words become “incomparably 
richer in essential content” (142). This is exactly what occurs with Heidegger’s 
“clarification” of Brauch. Here, a common term and an ordinary verb (brauchen) come to 
manifest themselves in a far greater depth—they come to show themselves as wellsprings 
that can name an essential occurrence with beings, even Being itself. Whether his leap to 
the Latin frui is philologically tenable is of little to no consequence; what matters is that, 
“with the help of an encounter with the foreign language,” the German word comes to 
resound in an unfamiliar way, and for this reason, a more profound, richer, and more 
thought worthy way (HHdI 65-6). What about them makes them so worthy of thought, 
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however, can only be seen by how they enrich and enliven Anaximander’s saying as a 
whole.  
 Proceeding from the “new” way of thinking what Brauch says (the last line of 
the above block quote) and linking it with the necessity of seeing it as “the oldest name in 
which thinking brings the Being of beings to language” (274), Heidegger tells us that 
“‘usage’ now designates the way in which Being itself presences as the relationship to 
what is present which is concerned and handles it as what is present” (277).   
 Disposing order and reck, usage releases the present being and delivers each to 
its while. By doing so, however, it places it in permanent danger that its tarrying 
in the while will petrify into mere persistence. Thus, at the same time, usage 
hands presencing over into dis-order…. For this reason what stays awhile in 
presence can come to presence only insofar as it allows order and reck to 
belong: to usage. What presences always presences kata to chreon, within the 
lines of usage. Usage is the disposing and preserving gathering of what 
presences always into its tarrying presence (278).  
 
 Through his etymological foray through German and Latin, Heidegger has 
allowed chreon to come to language not as the binding “must” of necessity, but rather as 
the “disposing preserving gathering,” the original granting of presence, the Es gibt Sein. 
By engaging Anaximander as an early Greek thinker, a thinker who grappled and 
struggled with Being in a serious and thoughtful way (rather than as a premature scientist 
or a pre-Platonic/Aristotelian), he allows translation the freedom of arriving at its words 
solely through a thoughtful dialogue and encounter with the thinking Anaximander’s 
saying tries to bring to language—as well as language itself.  
 To conclude this last chapter, we return to the question with which we began: 
how is the Greek experience preserved in the German translations? As it has both been 
described and seen in Heidegger’s own writing, the process of translation consists in 
moving from a series of conventional translations back to the original (Greek) terms they 
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attempt to convey, from here arriving at an appropriate translation by means of 
etymology/philology and comparison with other instances in which we encounter it (in 
early Greek thinking). Through this process, Anaximander’s saying evolved from a 
beginner’s attempt to scientifically explain a natural process to a primordial experience of 
Being. Regardless of whether or not Heidegger’s etymology and interpretation of 
Homer’s seer are convincing, one cannot deny that they are intriguing—that they are 
“incomparably richer” in their “essential content.” Questions like whether it is 
appropriate to use moral-juridical concepts in scientific explination have been replaced 
with questions about the history of metaphysics and the essence of presencing. In the end, 
Heidegger sees in the span of twelve words16 an entirely new way of thinking Being 
unfold, a way of thinking that refuses to be reduced to metaphysics, and thus a way that 
might provide a new path for thinking after the completion of metaphysics. 
 To adress the question of whether or not an original Greek way of thinking is 
preserved in Heidegger’s translations, it seems that we must go about finding a way of 
confirmation. Most obviously, this would consist of an historical inquiry into 
philosophical and historical texts from a certain period of Greek antiquity, an inquiry that 
might follow Heidegger’s lead by comparing his translations with other instances key 
words come up in such texts. As far as Heidegger’s own inquiry is concerned, however, 
the kinds of confirmation or proof such methods would result in are arbitrary if not totally 
irrelevant. For Heidegger, the Greeks are not a certain set of people existing between 
certain dates: “what is Greek is that dawn of destiny as which Being itself lights itself up 
in beings and lays claim to an essence of humanity” (253), perhaps what Heidegger refers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 This number refers to the word count of the quotation Heidegger believes to be 
assuredly attributable to Anaximander.  
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to as the West or “the Evening-Land” (245). From this perspective (although Heidegger 
surely would not call it that), confirming whether Anaximander “truly” thought in the 
way Heidegger’s translation conveys can, as we have noted time and time again, come 
solely through a thoughtful dialogue with Anaximander’s saying itself (a dialogue that 
would result in a translation that, because it could only be a reiteration of Heidegger or go 
against Heidegger, would be inadequate according to his terms).  
 The question of confirmation takes on different meaning when we see 
translation as an act of creative appropriation. From this angle, whether Anaximander’s 
“true” thoughts correspond to Heidegger’s translation is irrelevant; instead, the question 
is whether his translation appropriates early Greek thinking “authentically”—whether the 
spirit of the Greek is not obscured or covered over but rather creatively brought into the 
German language. Such a “bringing hither [Übersetzung]” does not take as its measure 
the possibility of an exact equivalency between languages, for “there is no such thing as 
translation if we mean that a word from one language could, or even should, be made to 
substitute as the equivalent of a word from another language” (HHdI 62). Instead, 
acknowledging the need to forsake a desire for what is literal in favor of creativity, 
Heidegger’s method of translation embraces the prospect that translation only truly 
becomes faithful when it takes its bearing solely from “the language of the matter,” that 
is, solely from what Anaximander’s saying requires us to think (AS 243). For Heidegger, 
when we discard Platonic and Aristotelian lenses along with everything else that might 
hinder us from experiencing early Greek thought and truly take our bearing from a 
thoughtful engagement, what comes to language in the saying is nothing other than a 
primordial experience of Being, an example and a path for the future of thinking. 
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 When we think translation as creative appropriation, and when we take our 
bearing from the matter of thought present in the saying (and perhaps this necessarily 
means the way in which the saying thinks Being), how are we to answer the question of 
whether or not the Greek experience is preserved in Heidegger’s translations? Must we 
simply take his word that a truly thoughtful dialogue with Anaximander can lead only to 
this translation? Perhaps the strength of Heidegger’s translation can only be seen on the 
basis of the thoughts it conveys. That is, perhaps its strength can only be determined by a 
thoughtful dialogue with it.  
 ...along the line of usage; for they let order and reck belong to one another (in 
the surmounting) of dis-order (280).  
 
 If one were to come upon this translation out of context, utter confusion would 
immediately arise. Said this way, not only does the saying lose any sense of being a 
scientific statement about nature—it comes across as complete nonsense. We, however, 
who have followed Heidegger through his process, know that almost every word of this 
quotation is invested with a hidden wealth and richness, and that this quotation, when 
seen in its essential breadth, gives words to something meaningful: an experience of 
Being outside of the ways we are accustomed. Through these words, the clearing comes 
to language as the temporal dimensionality of Being, the realm in which beings make 
their stand in stubborn persistence or linger only momentarily, following the movement 
of presencing. Amongst this realm, beings are not objects at hand or ready to hand, nor is 
their reality confirmed on the basis of a subject’s representation. Instead, beings, 
including even (or perhaps especially) man himself, are understood from out of an 
experience of Being, an experience that does not establish a hierarchy of beings but 
instead simply lets beings: be. 
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Conclusion: Being, Language, and Translation 
 
 As we near our end, let us once more return to the quote with which we began 
our way through Heidegger’s thinking.  
And it requires a new attentiveness to language, not the invention of new terms, as 
I once thought, but rather a return to the original contents of our own language as it 
has been conceived, which is constantly decaying (PR viii). 
 
The future of thinking, as defined by the attempt to overcome metaphysics, 
requires a new attentiveness to language: a new way of hearing it and responding to it 
that remains open to beings in the way they demand themselves to be manifested. Such 
attentiveness allows beings to come to presence as things rather than objects, allows them 
to appear through thoughtful poetic description rather than the formulaic categorizations 
of science. This description is not achieved through the invention of new terms that might 
better serve to give word to beings, but through a return to the original contents of 
languages, the archaic forms and antiquated uses that have been buried over the course of 
time. For it is this burial and decay that has led language to forfeit its essential nature, 
whether this nature is seen as its potential to give words to beings as things, or whether it 
is seen as the essential abode of man’s existence as Dasein—even the house of Being 
itself. The only way to combat this decadence of language is to develop a kind of 
thinking that occurs by returning to the original contents of our language, by de-
subjectivizing our vocabulary and grammar through stripping away the layers of 
classification and specification that have divested words (Worte) of their essential 
breath—leaving us only with terms (Wörter) 
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Through his work with “thinking” and its relation to thanking and memory, 
Heidegger has shown us both how the original contents of words can help to give them a 
far richer, more diverse, and more disclosive power, and how our encounter with a 
foreign language might serve to bring about new and novel realizations about our own 
language, that which tends to ceaselessly level itself off in everydayness. Through his 
work with Homer and the way the words of Anaximander’s saying were understood in 
this pre-metaphysical time, and by working with archaic formulations and grammatical 
transformations, Heidegger not only shows us how to begin to think in a Greek 
(unmetaphysical) way, but further, shows us how the return to the original contents of a 
language can exist simultaneously with the process of translation. In fact, in the case of 
“Anaximander’s Saying,” it is translation that allows the original contents of Greek to be 
heard once more, now in an odd-sounding yet conceptually rich German appropriation.  
Here, in the context of the Greeks, the return to and preservation of the original 
contents of language by means of translation gains an even greater significance: it 
becomes a potential source for the rekindling of the question of Being. Of course this is 
not to say that Being is cast aside in his work with the original contents of German, but 
rather that what is crucial to note is that, as far as the future of thinking is concerned, a 
place in which the return to the original contents of language, translation, and the 
question of Being become intimately intertwined seems especially worthy of our 
consideration. For here, many of the central strands of Heidegger’s thinking come to a 
head: the paths he treads do not diverge but come to coincide in a vibrant harmony.  
One final context in which the return to the original contents of language and 
translation must be seen is in the transition Heidegger sees from Greek to Latin. For as 
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we have noted already in relation to “The Origin of the Work of Art,” beneath these 
“seemingly literal and thus faithful” translations lies concealed “a translation of Greek 
experience into a different way of thinking. Roman thought takes over the Greek words 
without a corresponding, equally original experience of what they say, without the Greek 
word” (OWA 149). The Greek words—ta onta, aidikia, alētheia, etc.—are, together with 
“an original experience of what they say,” lost with their Latin translations: another 
reason for the imperative Heidegger gives thinking at the end of metaphysics. Here, the 
return—a process of re-translation, we might say—is required because of the potential for 
translation to exist “inauthentically.” Because of these translations’ historical 
consequence, by re-translating them, Heidegger is, in effect, rewriting history itself. Or, 
thought of another way, Heidegger is climbing back down history step-by-step, reaching 
the early Greek thinkers, and taking a back door he calls “thinking.”  
This pivotal position lends translation its vital significance: for only it can help us 
achieve the attentiveness to language required for the future of thinking. Such 
attentiveness, achieved through a meditation on and the process of translation, can be 
characterized as the acknowledgment of the four dimensions of translation and language 
(as ontological, existential, aesthetic, and political/historical). By seeing these four 
dimensions, the “world” of translation opens itself before us, showing itself as the 
possibility to rekindle the question of the meaning of Being, the possibility for man to 
fully become Da-sein, the possibility of restoring language to its poetic essence, and the 
possibility to forge a new political and historical path for thinking. Only through these 
essential possibilities does translation become what it truly is for Heidegger: a matter on 
which the destiny of mankind itself rests.  
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However, amidst all of the discussion of translation, the spirit of languages, and 
the plurality of languages that have led us to this point, we have yet to even acknowledge 
what may well be an integral question: where do we stand as English speakers/readers? In 
this context, a skeptic could ask us: have Heidegger’s translations really given us access 
to the original thinking of the Greeks, when what we are working with is translations of 
Heidegger’s translations? Can the original Greek way of thinking, supposedly preserved 
in Heidegger’s German translation, be further preserved in an English translation? If we 
want an authentic English translation of Anaximander’s saying, would it be better to set 
aside the German entirely and work solely between Greek and English? And if we 
pursued this, would the resulting translation really be any more authentic than that given 
by our translator?  
Time does not afford the opportunity to tackle these questions in the depth they 
require. Instead, we can only note that the question of our position as English speakers is 
something we would have to reckon with if we were to push further in our investigation. 
Although it might be difficult to extrapolate answers from Heidegger’s own writings, we 
can safely assume that given all that he finds necessary in the act of translation, if we 
really wished to preserve the original meaning of Anaximander’s saying in an English 
translation, a lot of work would have to be done. Such an investigation would surely 
prove beneficial for those of us interested in the divide between our American heritage 
and Heidegger’s complex but vital relationship with Germany, and would be perhaps 
even more interesting for those of us who wish to push the question of translation (as it is 
dealt with by Heidegger) even further.  
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Over the past few pages, we have done what is expected in a conclusion. Just as 
with a scientific article or an essay in any other branch of the humanities or social 
sciences, we have accumulated our results, summarized these findings, and tried to 
present them lucidly and succinctly. We have even provided a question for further 
research. All of this, however, has been very unHeideggerian. For in the same way that 
Hegel complicated the nature of introductions, Heidegger complicated the nature of 
conclusions. The role of a conclusion, when it comes to a Weg of thinking (path or way, 
the word Heidegger preferred to refer to his writings as opposed to “works” [Werke]), is 
quite different than that of an article in the social sciences—or even philosophy, 
especially as it is practiced today. For those of us who take part in modern academia, 
even those of us who call ourselves “philosophers,” our work consists of a certain kind of 
methodology that, through exegesis, interpretation, and argumentation, has as its 
conclusion a set of results to provide to the academic community. The end goal of 
amassing and presenting such results is, simply put, to restart the cycle; as Heidegger puts 
it, this kind of thinking “uses its results to direct itself toward new procedure”—in our 
terminology, academia uses its findings and arguments to stimulate more findings and 
arguments (AWP 63).  
This methodology and focus on results, which Heidegger identifies as the essence 
of science and extends to all disciplines that crave the position of authority science has 
assumed, is the polar opposite of Heidegger’s thinking. As one finds when upon reading 
almost all of his pieces, the conclusion sometimes seems to assert itself prematurely, 
either circling back to where we began and/or ending with the questions that “thinking” is 
truly concerned with. We might respond by saying that asking further questions is a quite 
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normal aspect of academic works. But these kinds of questions still cling to the cycle of 
research: for they simply provide the stepping-stones for more research and results. The 
questions Heidegger often ends with are quite different. Instead of providing the next 
moves for scholarship, he takes a turn. Subverting our traditional understanding of what 
(“academic”) writing accomplishes, Heidegger can, for example, claim that after having 
discussed thinking rather thoroughly, “we all still need an education in thinking” (EPTT 
449). Here we see that the didactic core of Heidegger’s thinking cannot be extrapolated 
by listing certain things that he said or wrote. Instead, it lies in the process, the 
movement, the circling back of these Wege themselves—much more like works of art 
than conventional philosophical treatises.    
As we touch upon this essential aspect of Heidegger’s thinking, we should be 
reminded both of the stakes of Heidegger’s thinking and the question of his supposed 
“language mysticism.” As we have seen throughout the current project, the stakes are 
incredibly high: only if language is put back on track might man avoid the oblivion of our 
modern, technological, metaphysical, nihilistic identity. One way in which we have seen 
Heidegger himself try to develop a greater attentiveness to language (required to put 
language back on track) is the way in which he addresses language, specifically in the 
formulation “language speaks.” Here, we might note something rather peculiar: for 
Heidegger, when the stakes of our world have reached their peak, the proper response is a 
kind of thinking that eschews all desire for results (what we must imagine to be necessary 
for world-historical change) in favor of some peculiar form of rebellion against 
traditional philosophical methodology. This, of course, elicits a question we have asked 
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many times: how are we to believe that the thinking Heidegger proposes can 
“accomplish” all he seems to think it can—and must?  
A quotation from the essay “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” is 
helpful here. Nearing the end of this Weg, Heidegger asks a question we have quoted 
earlier: “But is not all this”—“this” being a conversation about alētheia and the 
clearing—“unfounded mysticism or even bad mythology, in any case a ruinous 
irrationalism, the denial of ratio?” (448). To this, Heidegger eventually responds with the 
following: 
As long as ratio and the rational still remain questionable in what is their own, talk 
about irrationalism is unfounded. The technological-scientific rationalization 
ruling the present age justifies itself every day more surprisingly by its immense 
results. But this says nothing about what first grants the possibility of the rational 
and the irrational. The effect proves the correctness of technological-scientific 
rationalization. But is the manifest character of what is exhausted by what is 
demonstrable? Does not the insistence on what is demonstrable block the way to 
what is? (448).  
 
What assures us of the meaning of rational and irrational, as well as the divide 
between them? Is it not rationality that decides what is irrational, according to its self-
prescribed, logically coherent laws? And rationality itself, of course, is the supposed 
cornerstone of metaphysics. Its closest companion, logic, is for Heidegger—as we have 
seen—not the universal absolute it is assumed to be. Its propositions and most basic 
axioms, preserved in the immaculate logical-grammatical assertion, are stamped by a 
definitive historical event: the dawn of Greek ontology with Plato. Thus, in other words, 
the criticism of irrationality is unsubstantial. It is a tool, wielded by a certain way of 
thinking to preserve itself from what is other, be it sophistry, poetry, religion, etc. These 
ways of thinking have their own “logic,” we could say. But this logic means nothing to 
rationality: for it only acknowledges what is able to match it on its own terms—a domain 
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in which it was born master. Further, its “immense results” entrench its pride, and 
convince us, the awestruck onlooker, that what is averagely intelligible is all that is 
intelligible.  
“But is the manifest character of what is exhausted by what is demonstrable?” 
Does the proof of existence hang on fulfilling certain rational obligations? Might there be 
things, perhaps even more important things, outside the microscope of the law of non-
contradiction, cause and effect, and empirical verifiability? Might God defy even the 
greatest ontologist? Might justice elude every attempt at codification? Might some words 
defy every conceivable attempt at translation? In these contexts, “does not the insistence 
on what is demonstrable block the way to what is?”  
With these questions I am reminded of a passage from Book V of Nietzsche’s Gay 
Science, “‘Science’ as a prejudice.” In the vein of the above quoted question, Nietzsche 
notes that “scholars…can never catch sight of the really great problems and question 
marks” (334). He goes on to ask emphatically, “What? Do we really want to permit 
existence to be degraded for us like this—reduced to a mere exercise for a calculator and 
an indoor diversion for mathematicians?”  
Above all, one should not wish to divest existence of its rich ambiguity: that is a 
dictate of good taste, gentlemen, the taste of reverence for everything that lies 
beyond your horizon. That the only justifiable interpretation of the world should be 
one in which you are justified because one can continue to work and do research 
scientifically in your sense (you really mean, mechanistically?)—an interpretation 
that permits counting, calculating, weighing, seeing, and touching, and nothing 
more—that is a crudity and naiveté, assuming that it is not a mental illness, an 
idiocy. Would it not rather be probable that, conversely, precisely the most 
superficial and external aspect of existence—what is most apparent, its skin and 
sensualization—would be grasped first—and might even be the only thing that 
allowed itself to be grasped? A ‘scientific’ interpretation of the world, as you 
understand it, might therefore be one of the most stupid of all possible 
interpretations of the world, meaning that it would be one of the poorest in 
meaning. This thought is intended for the ears and consciences of our mechanists 
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who nowadays like to pass as philosophers and insist that mechanics is the doctrine 
of the first and last laws on which all existence must be based as on a ground floor. 
But an essentially mechanical world would be an essentially meaningless world 
(335).  
 
The overlaps and echoes that could be found between this passage and what we 
have heard from Heidegger above are far too numerous and divergent for us to expand 
upon in the detail we might like, from the echo of “rich ambiguity” in Heidegger’s 
discussions of truth, the Nothing, Being, and “the mystery,” to the similarity between 
Heidegger’s critique of demonstrability and Nietzsche’s attack on mechanics. Although 
Nietzsche’s vehemence and sarcasm are certainly not matched by Heidegger, they agree 
when it comes to the stakes of the matter at hand. For both, “science” is not wrong. It is 
perfectly correct; it has been “proven” by immense results. But for all its correctness and 
success, and despite all its influence on the way most of us think, there are some 
questions it cannot answer and thus cannot even acknowledge. In Heidegger’s case, many 
of these questions are not simply yet to be asked, but instead have had a rich history that 
has been eclipsed over time. The more we have become convinced of the success of 
rationality and its scientific incarnation, the more we, too, cannot answer these 
questions—because we, too, cannot even acknowledge them.  
Of course, the assimilation with which we began—namely, that between the social 
sciences/humanities and the natural sciences—is, when taken to Nietzsche’s extreme, 
rather crude. But that is much less the case if we confine ourselves to Heidegger. For 
him, “philosophy is ending in the present age,” having reached its completion in the 
development of the “independent sciences” (EPTT 434). Philosophy “has found its place 
in the scientific attitude of socially active humanity,” having realized its goal of providing 
“ontologies of the various regions of beings (nature, history, law, art)” (435). In the end, 
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philosophy reaches its completion by disassembling itself: its questions answered, it 
hands itself down to the more specified pursuits of the natural and social sciences, its 
legitimacy superseded. Nothing demonstrates this better than the quickly vanishing place 
of philosophy in the universities, as well as the more everyday fact that when I tell 
someone that I am a philosophy major, they respond with a variation of the question: “but 
what are you actually going to do?”  
In the modern age, where technology is taking on an ever-greater role in society, 
where what we refer to as “metaphysical questions” are seen as little more than the 
lingering curiosity of a child, and where the merit of thinking is determined on the basis 
of its demonstrable results, it is hard to deny that philosophy is coming to an end. How 
long will it be until “continental philosophy” is completely subsumed in “comparative 
literature” programs, even simply the category “literature” itself? How long will it be 
until computer science, mathematics, physics, neurology, neuroscience, etc. render 
“analytic philosophy” a rather archaic classification? Heidegger found these questions, or 
rather the root or kernel of these questions, imminently pressing in his own time. His 
worries would be far greater today.     
But what does language have to do with all of this? And how can his supposed 
“language mysticism” do anything about it? Given that mysticism is associated with 
irrationality, and irrationality has now been put into question, we must (again) try to 
understand Heidegger’s phrase “language speaks” in another way. As we noted with the 
help of Charles Taylor, this phrase should not be interpreted “as a proto-Derridean 
invocation of a super(non)subject,” but rather as the demand for a new attentiveness to 
language, a way of relating to things with our words in accordance with the way those 
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things themselves—and language itself—demand to come to presence. For Heidegger, 
language “is no longer arbitrary, up for grabs,” but rather requires of us certain ways of 
speaking that can displace the logical-grammatical tradition of subjectivity and begin to 
“restore thingness” to things (Taylor 266), ways of speaking that simultaneously move 
away from the scientific and towards the poetic.    
It may seem that such words like demand and requirement continue to 
anthropomorphize language, to think language as a kind of subject that wills in a certain 
way. But this, despite its sound, is not what Taylor and Heidegger mean. Instead, the 
words language speaks give voice to a turn in thinking: they do not name a subject that 
wills things to be a certain way, but a way of thinking language in its essential nature as 
something beyond our will, beyond our manipulation, beyond our beck and call. The way 
language exists is not the same as any idea or entity we are familiar with—language is 
not. It is not, because when we say the word is, what we mean is an entity present-at-
hand, something we come into contact with, something with definite features and 
characteristics. When we ask, “what is language?”, we are already working in the realm 
of science and technology. We ask for what such thinking can supply: research, 
arguments, characteristics, results. Heidegger asks a different kind of question. Heidegger 
asks: how is it with language? His answer is: language speaks. As it exists essentially, it 
is not an entity present-at-hand nor an entity ready-to-hand, but rather a kind of showing, 
an illuminating, a clearing occurrence, a disclosure of our world and what it means to be-
there. “Language speaks”: this means that language is only as the perpetual possibility of 
the illumination of our existence and Being itself.  
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This is not mysticism in the ordinary sense. Nor is it necessarily irrational. Its 
“revolt” against our common, traditional way of thinking is not that of Hugo Ball and the 
Dadaists, nor of André Breton and the Surrealists, nor that of mystical religious traditions 
like Sufism. Heidegger did not write manifestos, nor was he motivated by political, 
social, religious, or even aesthetic ideals. Heidegger wanted something quite different—
he wanted “thinking.” Such thinking occurs “outside of the distinction of rational and 
irrational”; it is “more sober-minded…than scientific technology, more sober-minded and 
hence removed, without effect, yet having its own necessity” (EPTT 449). It is “neither 
theoretical nor practical. It comes to pass before this distinction.” For such thinking “has 
no result. It has no effect. It satisfies its essence in that it is. But it is by saying its matter.” 
In saying its matter, “it is freer” than technology, science, and metaphysics: “for it lets 
Being—be” (259). While such descriptions are undoubtedly mysterious, ambiguous, and 
cryptic, it would be inaccurate to pejoratively discard them as mystical. With them, 
Heidegger—as Derrida and others have attempted—tries to stake a claim outside of the 
tradition, outside of our conventional apparatuses and terminology, beyond the axioms of 
proper speaking (think of Derrida’s différance and Heidegger’s Seyn), or perhaps even 
“beneath” them. The difference is not one of rational and irrational, but just that: a 
difference.  
“Language,” Heidegger writes, “plays with our speech—it likes to let our speech 
drift away into the more obvious meaning of words.” 
It is as though man had to make an effort to live properly with language. It is as 
though such a dwelling were especially prone to succumb to the danger of 
commonness. The place of language properly inhabited, and of its habitual words, 
is usurped by common terms. The common speech becomes the current speech. 
We meet it on all sides, and since it is common to all, we now accept it as the only 
standard (WhD? 118-19).  
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This drift of language towards commonness is mirrored in the scientific-
technological drive for complete domination through the vehicle of average intelligibility. 
Because it would be inappropriate to speak in causal terms, we should imagine that the 
modern tendency of science is a kind of symptom or a symbol of our decaying 
relationship with language. It is our relationship to things, governed since the dawn of 
Greek philosophy by the way we speak about them (logos), that has conditioned the 
unfolding of the West as the move toward the unbridled manipulability of everything. 
Language, in its tendency to fall prey to what is common, aggravated by the falling of 
Dasein, has dragged thinking along with it. It has set the standard of speech and thought: 
commonality, average intelligibility, universal, unhindered access. Rationality and logic, 
along with the stability and seeming authority they represent, are in this sense the 
manifestations of, rather than the reasons for, the path language and thought have tread 
through the course of metaphysics. They coincide with the drift of language, because they 
provide a stability and semblance of authority that bolster and reinforce a common 
standard, a sense of security that allows what is not obvious to simply fall into the 
category of unintelligible.  
Heidegger’s thinking about language is meant to challenge this standard. In his 
writing, no word is spared from scrutiny; all that is obvious is flipped on its head and put 
into doubt as the most worthy of questioning. Self-evidence becomes the enemy, for “the 
familiar…always remains the real danger zone [for thinking]” (WhD? 154). We must 
challenge ourselves to think through the history and evolution of words, their 
transformations from language to language, and the inherent instability of language itself. 
The obvious is, as Nietzsche’s writes, mere superficiality and externality. A mechanical 
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interpretation of language—what is longed for by many positivists and analytic 
philosophers—might for all its correctness prove herein to be “the poorest in meaning.” It 
might portray the shell of language, but it says nothing of how it is with language, 
nothing of how language concerns us, “befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms 
and transforms us” (NL 57, italics added). With the analytic and scientific attitude 
towards language, we are left out of the picture entirely. Hence why this view lends itself 
so affectively to an understanding of language as a tool, something independent, self-
sufficient, that we can pick up and wield when we please.   
While we have seen the extreme effort it takes to be attentive to language in 
writings like “The Way to Language,” the complexity of what language demands is seen 
even more in the process of translation. In the translator’s attempt to leap from the spirit 
of one language into that of another, and in our attempt to follow Heidegger’s leap from 
German to Greek, perhaps we have even practiced the leap to thinking itself. Without 
overstating this, we can acknowledge that there exists a close affinity between trying to 
think outside of our “national” bubble and trying to think outside of our “metaphysical” 
bubble. Both tasks require the embrace of the Unheimlich, the uncanny, unfamiliar, 
unhomelike. Both demand that we experience words in a new way, not as absolute terms 
or singular concepts but as amorphous, historical, contingent ways of disclosing beings. 
And finally, both demand a new way of Being—a way of Being with language, rather 
than a way of Being a being with language (the rational animal).  
In authentic translation, we rehearse the leap beyond metaphysics. Here, thinking 
occurs as the return to the original contents of language, both of the language to be 
translated and the language providing the translation. We immerse ourselves in words 
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and their histories, the way in which they spoke in times long forgotten, superseded by 
what comes most immediately to the fore. We engage and confront the matter of thought 
such words try to give voice to, and from such confrontation come to gain a greater 
appreciation of the plurality of language. In translation, the fact that “different languages 
perform different worlds” comes to the fore, and we are forced to mediate this 
unmediatable difference (Cassin 11). In the impossibility of a task we are determined to 
make possible, we are forced to develop a new attentiveness to language and languages, 
to their idioms, rhythms, and idiosyncrasies, to the richness veiled beneath what we have 
always taken to be quite obvious. Through this process, one thing becomes certain: 
“language is and is only through the difference between languages” (Cassin 249). 
In translation, practiced in a Heideggerian way, we embark on a kind of thinking 
that does not end in results. Of course, the end goal of this process is to end at a 
“resulting” translation—but this is not a result in the scientific sense. The attentive 
thinking in translation neither deduces certain conclusions nor makes advances in a 
progressing discipline. The essence of translation is preservation. While creativity and 
appropriation must be involved, it is at the heart of translation to preserve the thinking 
present in the original, to bring to language what it was able to bring to language. 
Through such preservation, the translator, it might be said, “gains the essential poverty of 
the shepherd, whose dignity consists in being called by Being”—or in our case, 
language—“itself into the preservation of Being’s truth”—or in our case, language’s 
(plural) truth (LH 245). The translator, in translating, is called upon by language to 
preserve its plurality across the leap from the spirit of one language to another. The 
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translator is summoned to challenge, with Heidegger, the standard determined by what is 
common, and insist on the coexisting identity and difference of translation and translated. 
As Heidegger writes in his lecture on Hölderlin’s “Der Ister,” “translation is never 
merely a technical issue but concerns the relation of human beings to the essence of the 
word and to the worthiness of language” (63). For Heidegger, translation is not “a kind of 
‘detour’ in the circulation of language,” a way of side-stepping a technical obstacle, but a 
“dialogue,” a way of opening up what is said in how it is said (65). And although such a 
dialogue may grant us access to an entirely new way of thinking, “translation is more an 
awakening, clarification, and unfolding of one’s own language with the help of an 
encounter with the foreign language” (65-6). In its preserving, translation unsettles our 
thoroughly self-evident and common relationship with the language we speak. The words 
we once thought we knew—e.g., “thinking” (Denken) or “usage” (Brauch)—shine in a 
new light, show themselves in a new way, confuse what we had always taken as clear. In 
translation, our relationship with what is most our own, the words we speak without a 
second thought as to their use or meaning, is put into question. In stumbling to find the 
right word in our language for what must be translated, we begin to realize the subtle 
complexities of our own language, its uniqueness and peculiarities, things we would have 
never seen if it were not for our encounter with the foreign language.   
It is in this way that translation is an essential part of understanding what 
Heidegger is doing with his writing and thinking on language (and in general). 
Translation enables, or perhaps demands, that we learn to think in a foreign way, that we 
embrace the spirit of the foreign language. In this way, it helps us and requires us to pay 
heed to the plurality of languages, to the difference that pervades the universal concept 
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“Language” in all of its historical and national manifestations. Even more, translation 
allows us to look at our own language in a new way by distancing ourselves from it; it 
makes foreign what was once perfectly clear and unequivocal, it challenges our 
assuredness of our mastery over language. Finally, through all of these, translation brings 
us to reflect on the nature of language itself, its identity, its difference, its mystery. 
Translation allows us to appropriate language for the first time, to make it our own 
through the struggle of finding the right word, and through the silence that prevails when 
our search fails. For language, Heidegger wrote in the 1950’s, only comes to “speak itself 
as language” when, “curiously enough,” “we cannot find the right word for something.” 
Here “we leave unspoken what we have in mind and, without rightly giving it thought, 
undergo moments in which language itself has distantly and fleetingly touched us with its 
essential Being” (NL 59). In translation, where these moments strike us and befall us 
again and again, we learn “to rid ourselves of the habit of always hearing only what we 
already understand”—in other words, we learn to have a new relationship towards 
language (58). We learn how to really listen to it, to have open ears, to heed its call. In a 
word, we learn attentiveness.  
Through the course of the present project, we have tried to develop such 
attentiveness. We have neither aimed at the amassing of results nor at conclusive and 
objectively verifiable conclusions. Instead, like Heidegger, we have tried to follow “the 
way” of thinking. As we have seen, following the way is much different than our normal 
philosophical and academic inquiries. An inquiry of this (common) kind, as Heidegger 
tells us in Was heißt Denken?, “aims straight for the answer. It rightly looks for the 
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answer alone, and sees to it that the answer is obtained. The answer disposes of the 
question. By the answer, we rid ourselves of the question” (158).  
The question “Was heißt Denken?”, just like “what is language?” and “what is 
translation,” are “of a different kind” (158). They are meant to point towards a way, to 
encourage us to set off on a way: to become “underway (Unterweg).” To think through 
these questions, rather to answer them, is the goal.  
The way of thinking cannot be traced from somewhere to somewhere like a well-
worn rut, nor does it at all exist as such in any place. Only when we walk it, and in 
no other fashion, only, that is, by thoughtful questioning, are we on the move on 
the way. This movement is what allows the way to come forward (169, italics 
added). 
 
For Heidegger, thinking (questioning) is not a path towards a destination (an 
answer). It is not a route that leads from point A to point B. Rather, like the country paths 
(Feldwege) Heidegger walked all his life, thinking rambles, wanders, and makes new 
paths, without “going anywhere.” Thinking is not a way in the sense of a “way to…”; 
instead it is simply—and for that reason, all the more difficult to understand—a way 
itself, a movement, a setting-forth without the need or the desire to “reach” or “achieve” 
something. Hence to respond to the question “what is language,” rather than to answer it, 
is the goal: “to answer the question…is itself always to keep asking, so as to remain 
underway” (169).    
Thus in the end, whether the reader has become “convinced” of Heidegger’s 
“claims”—be they of the grandiose and world-historical scale, or be they more modest 
and less “ambitious”—is not of central importance. Our primary ambition has not been to 
give a “definitive” Heideggerian response to the question of language and translation, as 
if it were possible to reduce his thinking to a set of statements and propositions “about” 
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language. While this had to be done in part, we would be fooling ourselves if we now 
characterized what we have “accomplished” as outlining Heidegger’s “philosophy of 
language.” In this strict sense, Heidegger has no “philosophy of language”—no agenda or 
program through which language could be made fully intelligible, its opacity and 
ambiguity overcome. The point is rather that, in questioning, this opacity and ambiguity 
come to confront us, befall us, confuse us, and convince us that the questions we have 
been working with have no simple answers. Thus even if the reader comes away from 
this project completely unconvinced as to the merits of Heidegger’s approach, it has not 
necessarily “failed.” For as Heidegger writes, when it comes to a question like the 
question of language, “one thing and one thing only matters”: “to make the question 
problematical” (WhD? 159, italics added.) From this, I conclude by stating my only wish, 
which, at the same time, was Heidegger’s most fervent wish: that the questions we have 
asked have become questionable. 
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